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Personal Construct Theory as Radically Temporal Phenomenology: George Kelly’s
Challenge to Embodied Intersubjectivity
Abstract:
There are many consonances between  George Kelly’s personal construct psychology and  
post-Cartesian perspectives such as the intersubjective phenomenological project of 
Merleau-Ponty, hermeneutical constructivism, American pragmatism and autopoietic
self-organizing systems theory. But in comparison with the organizational dynamics of personal
construct theory, the above approaches  deliver the person over to semi-arbitrary shapings from
both the social sphere and the person’s own body, encapsulated in sedimented bodily and
interpersonally molded norms and practices.  Furthermore, the affective and cognate aspects of
events are artificially split into functionally separated entities, and then have to be pieced together
again via  interaction.  By contrast, pushes and pulls are conspicuously lacking from Kelly’s
depiction of the relationship between the construing subject and their world. Kelly complements
Heidegger in offering a radically temporal phenomenology and a strongly anticipatory stance. 
Both authors abandon the concept of subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a
self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming movement.  A paradoxical
implication  of Kelly’s radical temporal grounding of experience is that it is at the same time
more fully in motion and transition than embodied intersubjective models, and maintains a more
intimate and intricate thread of self-continuity and self-belonging.
Introduction
As post-rationalist and post-positivist discourses have increasingly made their way into
psychological theorizing in recent years, students of George Kelly’s personal construct
psychology have followed suit in uncovering the many consonances between his approach and
overlapping post-Cartesian perspectives  such as the intersubjective phenomenological project of
Merleau-Ponty, hermeneutical constructivism, American pragmatism and autopoietic
self-organizing systems theory. What students of Kelly such as John Shotter (2007), Gabrielle
Chiari and Trevor Butt find promising in Kelly’s approach is what they see as his attempt to
jettison modernist idealist and realist tropes in favor of a non-dualistic, indissociable interaction
between subject and world. They also like that Kelly makes affect and intention-cognition
inseparable, that thought is embodied in the sense that it is oriented and shaped by felt
significance and relevance.  The Kelly that they embrace sees cognition as intertwined with
bodily feeling , and embedded within interpersonal social dynamics. 
I support these readings of Kelly as far as they go, but in this paper I would like to point toward 
a more radical Kelly, one who ventured a step or two beyond the limits of the embodied and
phenomenological  perspectives that a number of his supporters and critics are attempting to
connect him to. I am in agreement with Gabriele Chiari and others who argue that, despite
Kelly’s protests to the contrary, there are strong commonalities between personal construct
theory and phenonological ideas. In fact, this  paper is in part my attempt to make amends for the
woeful ignorance of phenomenological philosophy I demonstrated in my first published article
on George Kelly in 1990. At that time, my only exposure to Husserl and Heidegger had been
through secondary sources, many of the same sources that led Kelly to dismiss phenomenology. 
But there are important differences among phenomenological writers, and in order to properly
situate this radical Kelly, it will be necessary to distinguish between the approach to
phenomenology represented  by Merleau-Ponty and what I will call a radically temporal
phenomenology, exemplified by Heidegger’s being in the world. 
The thesis I will argue  is that a crucial dimension of Kelly’s philosophy and psychology is 
being missed when we read him using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as a normative frame of
reference. Instead, I argue that Kelly’s approach offers a decisive alternative 
to that approaches’ explanation of the role of alterity in one’s relationship to one’s body as 
well as intersubjective engagements
I propose this radically temporal Kelly because  
1) To me he is the most interesting Kelly.  
2) this Kelly has not been presented yet in the literature.  
3) This reading of Kelly is consistent with certain interpretations of Heidegger, (Derrida’s in
particular, which contrasts with Gadamer’s appropriation of him). 
Concerns about Personal Construct Theory’s Rationalist-sounding Language
At the same time that embodied writers identify commonalities between personal construct
theory and phenomenology, Kelly’s approach differs from  embodied, hermeneutic and certain
phenomenological approaches in ways that invite concern among advocates of these positions. 
As I will argue, some of these concerns are legitimate responses to Kelly’s vague  and potentially
misleading use of language.  But I suggest that they are equally the result of a misreading of the
underlying assumptions of the theory. 
Summarizing the main critiques of personal construct theory from an embodied perspective:
1)Kelly employs an engineering flavored vocabulary that seems to subordinate an empirical and
social outside to the ‘top down’ structures of the internal system. Kelly’s terminology contributes
to the impression that constructs are rationalistic templates that resist time and otherness. For
instance, Kelly’s talk of the person choosing from among a repertory of constructs gives the
impression of stored concepts. He says persons “erect”, “invent” or “devise” a system of
constructs and then “select from their personal repertories the constructs they intend to apply to
the situation at hand.”(Kelly 1969d).
For this reason it  could seem  as though Kelly had one foot in rationalism and one foot in a post-
realist phenomenology, sounding like an epistemological constructivist in some writings but not 
in others. 
 As Trevor Butt (2009) argues:
“ PCT can be read as both a somewhat positivistic cognitive theory, as well as a 
phenomenological approach. One way of understanding the two readings is to see them as 
occupying the two poles of the lived world/objective thought construct. PCT is open to a reading
that implicitly rests on the natural attitude of dualism and, moreover, on the causal explanations
that inhabit the objective thought of the natural sciences.”
He adds that,  although Kelly’s theory lends itself to interpretation through an empirical naturalist
filter, wherein constructs are behind and responsible for behavior,  it can be coaxed in the
direction of a thoroughgoing embodied approach . 
2) Kelly’s choice corollary’s claim that we always make the elaborative choice seems to be an
untestable truism. More importantly, it seems to replace the intersubjective basis of
experiencing with an inner directed idealism( an internal regulating gyroscope).  
3)Kelly’s depictions  of a reality independent of the subject that our constructions progressively
approximate seems to suggest a dualistic epistemological realism rather than a  thoroughgoing
constructivism. 
I want to begin addressing these concerns directed against personal construct theory by taking a
closer look at Butt’s claim that Kelly’s model can be interpreted as rationalistic. 
Butt(1998) writes:
“ When the construct is first introduced, it is with this definition: "a way in which things are alike
and yet different from others" (Kelly, 1955, p. 104; italics added). The image produced is one of
the person standing back and placing interpretations on events in the world rather as they may
sort objects.” This “allows (and perhaps even encourages) the reader to think in terms of
concepts. The construct is an abstraction that differentiates between ‘things’. In what we may call
the ‘later Kelly’ however, the two poles of a construct are not things, but possible courses of
action.” (Looking back: George Kelly and the Garden of Eden, The Psychologist,  march 2012,
vol.25)
For Butt the difference between ‘sorting objects’ and recognizing a new event in primordial
fashion is the difference between mechanistically applying a pre-existing program vs finding
oneself actively exposed to, affected and changed by an aspect of the world, prior to all
reflection, theorization and deliberation. 
Even if Butt is correct that in his later writing  Kelly moved away from the articulation  of
construing in terms of what appeared to Butt like a rationalistic sorting function in favor of an
emphasis on ‘action’, Kelly never deviated from his defining of anticipation in terms of the
replication of events.  As late as 1966, Kelly continued to define the construction corollary  as :
“A person anticipates events by construing their replications.” (A Brief Introduction to personal
construct theory )
In order to get a better understanding of what Kelly intended , we need to take a closer look at the
language Kelly(1955) used in the  construction corollary:
“ a construct is a way in which some things are alike and yet different from others. In its
minimum context a construct would be a way in which two things are alike and different from a
third. “ “The things or events which are abstracted by a construct are called elements.” ( p.95) 
In mentioning both things and events, did Kelly mean that there are at least two distinct entities
in the world, events and things, and that on some occasions it is events we construe and at other
it is ‘things’? No, I think Kelly used ‘things’ as a loose way of referring to events. The word
‘event’ comes up more than 300 times in his first volume, and ‘thing’ or ‘things’ appears 196
times, but predominantly  in the context of senses of meaning like ‘things to come’ ‘ things that
happen’ , ‘anticipation of things’, ‘one’s way of seeing things’, ‘knowing things’, ‘doing things’,
or as a simile for concrete events.
 In many passage of the book,  Kelly uses ‘thing’ and ‘event’ interchangeably. For instance :
 ”...it is not things that a scientist accumulates and catalogues; it is the principles or the
abstractions that strike through the things with which he is concerned. Thus a good scientist can
penetrate a bewildering mass of concrete events and come to grips with an orderly principle.”
I think since Kelly believed that  “The universe is essentially a course of events”, such entities as
physical objects are not fundamental to experience but derived abstractions ensuing from the
construing of unique events. Still,  I think Butt’s main point is not that for Kelly the elements that
a person construes in the world are  physical things rather than events. His concern is with how
the construct system creates meaning and relevance out of those  things, events or elements.
More specifically, he is concerned with how the construct system is impacted  and defined by the
world, how being in the world continuously remakes the subject. In other words, the relevant
issue here  is  the relationship between an event and a construct.
To answer this question, let’s begin with what we know about events. We know that events only
occur once; they are not temporally extended, self-inhering objects.
“...any sequence of events is the only sequence of its exact identical sort that ever occurred. It is
inconceivable, then, that any sequence could have occurred in any way other than that in which it
did without losing its identity. ““Since events never repeat  themselves, else they would lose their
identity, one can look forward to them only  by devising some construction which permits him to
perceive two of them in a  similar manner.”(Kelly 1955)
 What else can we say about events for Kelly other that they only occur once? We can say that,
from the perspective of the person experiencing it ,  the event has no existence apart from , and
cannot be separated from, one’s construction of it.  But the same is true of the construct we apply
to an event. Constructs are only ever experienced in the context of an event that they apply to.
Constructs give events meaning and events define constructs.
“In this world-past, present, and future ordered by each of us in his own way, constructs and
events are interwoven so that events give definition to constructs and constructs give meaning to
events.” (Kelly 1969f)
Thus, a construct without an event is like a subject without an object. Construct and event, the
subjective and the objective , are the indissociable poles of every moment of  awareness, akin to
Husserl’s  noetic (subjective)  and the noematic (objective) dimensions of an intentional act.
In a personal communication to Dennis Hinkle, Kelly said  “the events we so assiduously
construe are themselves constructs”. “Construing may itself be considered a sequence of events.”
If any given event of construing only happens once, then the entire superordinate system that
defines it only happens once in the particular meaning it has in relation  to events.  This is
because the system as a whole adjusts itself to the novelty that each new event introduces into the
system.
”... no construct ever stands entirely alone; it makes sense only as it appears in a network.”  
“...while it is events that one seeks to anticipate, one makes one’s elaborative choice in order to
define or extend the system which one has found useful in anticipating those events. We might
call this ‘a seeking of self-protection’, or ‘acting in defense of the self’, or ‘the preservation of
one’s integrity’. But it seems more meaningful to keep clearly in mind what the self is, what it is
designed to do, and what integral function is served. Thus we hope it is clear that what we
assume is that the person makes his choice in favor of elaborating a system which is functionally
integral with respect to the anticipation of events.“  “One’s construction system is
never completely at rest. Even the changes which take place in it must themselves be
construed. “
Kelly says not every event that we construe leads to the creation of a new construct, leaving the
impression that constructs are static  schemes that resist exposure to an outside world:
 “...a new act often involves a new construct and one finds himself on the verge of new constructs
as a result of his venturesome acts.”...”the successive revelation of events invites the person to
place new constructions upon them whenever something unexpected happens.” “...whether a
client develops new constructs to channelize his movement, or whether he rattles around in the
old slots, the constructs of his system may be considered both as controls and as pathways along
which he is free to move.” Without “permeable superordinate constructs he is limited to a more
or less footless shuffling of his old ideas.”
What is one doing with one’s construct system when one is not creating a new construct?
Apparently slot-rattling. That is, defining one’s current system by rearranging subordinate
constructs or repositioning oneself with respect to the poles of certain of one’s constructs. 
 Events which trigger the creation of  new constructs clearly represent a more significant degree
of change within one’s system as a whole than events that do not prompt such revisions. But the
fact that a person is presumed by Kelly to be always in motion 
(“... there is no wish to suggest that we are dealing with anything not already in motion. What is
to be explained is the direction of the processes, not the transformation of states into processes.
We see states only as an ad interim device to get time to stand still long enough for us to see what
is going on. “ (Kelly 1966)
 implies that even when he is not creating new constructs, he is still creating new meaning in his
system as a whole, which is why Kelly refers to the definition of one’s network of constructs
(slot-rattling) as an elaboration of the system.
At the superordinate level, such alteration is subtle enough as to allow us to say that for all
intents and purposes, the system as a whole remains the same  in the face of ordinary everyday
happenings. But the system as a whole, and by implication its subordinate elements, never
remains identical from moment to moment. 
The double essence of a construct as internally generated guidance and externally imposed
novelty makes it more appropriate to consider of it as a form of questioning than as an answer.
Why is this so? A question implies two dimensions. First, inquiry always takes its direction from
a point of view and a context of understanding that projects itself forward through the terms of
the question. 
Heidegger (2010) expresses this well :
“Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its direction beforehand from what is 
sought. Questioning is a knowing search for beings in their thatness and whatness.... As 
questioning about, . . questioning has what it asks about. All asking about . . . is in some way an 
inquiring of... As a seeking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of 
being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way. We intimated that we are always 
already involved in an understanding of being.”  
Second, a question implies the possibility that it could be invalidated, and such invalidation can
apply either to a subordinate detail within the outlook under which the question was generated, or
it could mean an invalidation of one’s entire outlook. The expression “not even wrong “ points to
this second possibility. 
“...any proposition we contrive must be regarded as a crude formulation of a question which, at
best, can serve only as an invitation to further inquiry, and one that can be answered only through 
personal experience and in terms of the ad interim criterion of anticipated events. Indeed, the 
answer we get is not likely to be exactly an answer to our question at all, but an answer to some 
other question we have not yet thought to ask.“(Kelly 1969c)
“ To ask a question is to invite a reply. If the question is relevant to anything of human account  
then presumably the reply will change one's perception of himself and his world. Sometimes one  
anticipates a reply which will confirm a position he has already taken, that is to say, one from  
which he has been accustomed to launch his inquiries . But the confirmation, if it occurs, will  
nonetheless alter his experience only because it puts his position in a more presumptuous  
light.” (Kelly 1969c) 
It is not simply that a construct MAY at some point be subjected to a test of its validity. The
radically temporal nature of experience guarantees that such a test  will ensue with every new
moment of time.  We may at times  deploy strategies (hostility, constriction, loosening) to stave
off the most chaotic of changes in our lives and thereby delay or minimize the emotional impact
of a potentially massive invalidation of our outlook, in which case validation may be incidental,
vague or fragmentary. But even in these situations, our system remains at some level exposed to,
interrogated and modified by the events it warily encounters. 
Butt’s concern about a construct system that ‘stands back’ and mechanistically processes, orders
and sorts the world doesn’t jibe with the model of constructs, and the entire system of which they
are a part, as actively altered by the events they interpret. In the sense that a construct organizes
worldly happenings so as to recognize them in terms of familiarity, it can be said to ‘sort’ them.
But  then, in the embodied approaches Butt endorses,  elements of the world are anticipated and
recognized also. It is not anticipatory recognition per se that he objects to in the Kellian process
of construction , it is the aim of the construct system to recognize the most unusual future “in
terms of a replicated aspect of the familiar past“.
Replication and Strong Anticipation 
The key to understanding the role of anticipation in Kelly’s approach is bound up in the meaning
of ‘replication’, a notion that  is indispensable to  the understanding of Kelly’s organization, 
sociality, and choice  corollaries, and is closely linked to his notions of validation and
elaboration.  If we were simply to conclude that an anticipatory tendency characterizes at al
levels Kelly’s project, then we could justifiably claim that he has this in common with
Merleau-Ponty, whose approach also is oriented around anticipatory temporality. But it is not
simply that Kelly claims anticipation  as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an
event, rather that his going beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency.
Butt is right that Kelly’s organizational dynamics give great emphasis to assimilative subsuming
of events within the system.
 The fact that anticipation is  directed toward replicative  themes defines Kelly’s model as
strongly anticipatory. Kelly and Butt agree that one’s system, at the same time, in the same
moment, recognizes its world and is  changed by that world. Where they part company is Kelly’s
insistence that  an irreducible dimension of belonging characterizes the system’s relation to even 
the most shockingly chaotic experiences. Even in difference, negation, senselessness,
irrationality, alterity,  there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way
variation on a   thematics for Kelly , a similarity-in-difference. The Construction corollary
defines construing in terms of dimensions of similarity. Combined with the organization
corollary, we get a system in which differences are subordinated to  superordinate themes and
relationalities. 
Kelly says a person “must develop a system in which the most unusual future can be anticipated
in terms of a replicated aspect of the familiar past.”  
Kelly(1969c) on how even the most surprising events are anticipated to some degree at a
superordinate level: “ There are first-time occurrences in the history of mankind too. Again, as in
the lifetime of the individual, it is these, rather than the repetitions of history, to which thoughtful
appraisal must, in retrospect, attach greater significance. Yet human history records no event as
utterly unexpected. The posture of anticipation, which is the identifying psychological feature of
life itself, silently forms questions, and earnest questions erupt in actions. Unprecedented
consequences ensue. But when the novel contingencies occur, who, knowing how it was they
came about, can say they fell wholly outside the realm of human anticipation.”
The title of Kelly’s  paper ‘Confusion and the Clock (1960)’, which could have been aptly but
more  cumbersomely named ‘Impermeable Construing and Anticipatory Temporality’ nicely
encapsulates both the theme of that piece and what is most radical about his philosophy. The
‘clock’ refers to the anticipative nature of becoming for Kelly, its irreducible basis in construing
as  a dimensional way of movement that foresees beyond itself.  And ‘confusion’ refers to
Kelly’s understanding of such affectivities as guilt, anxiety and hostility as situations of
immediate or threatened confusion and chaos resulting from impermeable construing. In the
paper , Kelly makes the argument that even the most intense and disorganized forms of
emotional suffering and confusion, such as those he experienced after his heart attack,  point to
an overarching or superordinate thematic  of recognizability and foresight within which
disturbing events are assimilated.
Kelly(1960) on anticipating his heart attack:
“Was all this that happened something that was, in some measure, anticipated? Had I seen them
behind my Cousin Leander’s mask? Yes, I think so... In general, then, was it not, on the one
hand, a passage of human experience whose strange unprecedented notes derived significance
that early morning from the underlying theme of my life, which they so sharply embellished, and,
on the other, one whose meaning stemmed less from the repetitive familiarity of its details than
from what it seemed to foretell.” 
Kelly ‘s strongest statement of his faith in the potential of a replicative organization of
experience is the following :
“... ordinarily it would appear that there is a closer relationship between the motion of my fingers
and the action of the typewriter keys than there is, say, between either of them and the price of
yak milk in Tibet. But we believe that, in the long run, all of these events—the motion of my
fingers, the action of the keys, and the price of yak milk—are interlocked. It is only within a
limited section of the universe, that part we call earth and that span of time we recognize as our
present eon, that two of these necessarily seem more closely related to each other than either of
them is to the third. A simple way of saying this is to state that time provides the ultimate bond in
all relationships. “ (Kelly 1955)
Meaning Organization and Temporality: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Kelly 
How can we understand Kelly’s strong anticipatory approach  without resorting to accusations of  
rationalistic ‘sorting’?   Based on Butt’s various writings on phenomenology, when Butt said that
personal construct theory could be read as a phenomenological approach, it appears that what he
had in mind was Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt- based version of phenomenology. In my view, in order
to do justice to the philosophical implications of personal construct theory we need to look
beyond Merleau-Ponty’ s thinking. The remainder of this paper will explore the hypothesis that
Kelly’s notion of replication is at the root of the disconnect between personal construct theory
and the critiques I have been discussing. My reading of Kelly’s notion of replication depends on
the claim that Kelly’s approach is built upon a principle of psychological movement that differs
in fundamental ways from the causative accounts of hermeneutic, pragmatist, autopoetic  and
radical constructivist approaches,  as well as Merleau-Ponty’s corporal intersubjective account. 
Kelly’s  model of movement is  packed into the seemingly benign word ‘way’ as it is used in 
Kelly’ s  fundamental postulate: 
“a person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the WAY in which he anticipates
events”, 
and in his definition of a construct: 
“The WAY in which two or more events are alike and differ from a third” 
What is entailed in being a ‘way’ of making sense, relevance and meaning?  We can begin by
stating  the obvious: constructs, as  ways of making sense, are defined by their relation to other
ways of making sense belonging to  networks of similarities and differences, both within and
between individuals and larger social groups.But there is more to say about the  primitives of
psychological meaning than that their identity is inextricably bound  to larger personal and
interpersonal ensembles. 
Modern phenomenology got its start with Husserl’s assertion that stripping away the layers of
historically  acquired philosophical and scientific dogma via the reduction, in order to get  to ‘the
things themselves’, reveals to us an irreducible primitive of immediate present experience. But
rather than this primitive subsisting in an objectively present ‘now’ point appearing once before
being replaced by another in an infinite series of past and future punctual ‘nows’, Husserl
proposed the ‘now’ as a tripartite structure composed of a retentional, primal impression and
protentional phase.  In doing so, he replaced a temporality justifying objective causation with  the
temporality of the intentional act.  Events don’t appear anonymously as what they are in 
themselves , they appear to someone, are about something, and  reach out (protend) beyond their
immediate sense.  
So for Husserl , the WAY that we experience a present event is always a  complex relating
process weaving together  past , present and future in an indissociable unity. One can clearly
recognize Kelly’s anticipatory person-in-motion  in this model.  If for Husserl, the isolated
self-inhering presences forming the ‘nows’ of objective time are derivative abstractions of the
fundamental relationalities composing  phenomenological time, there is still more that can be
said about what is internal to a moment of time. A way of being a sense of meaning implies a
valuative  content. What can we say about the internal content of meanings apart from the
retentional-protentional structuration within which they are ensconced?
Before I address the way that  Kelly’s project deals with this question,  I want to introduce 
Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal intersubjective theory as a point of contrast, since his thinking
informs  the critiques of personal construct theory that this paper is centered around.  Merleau-
Ponty adopts Husserl’s tripartite structure of temporality and then inserts into it  a gestalt
organization as the irreducible ‘way’ of being any kind of valuative content. A figure appears
always against a background. The background is the system (ensemble, constellation,
environment, setting, scene) that the figure belongs to but also stands out against. 
For Merleau-Ponty, there is, outside of memory and anticipation, a concatenation of parts 
appearing in consciousness in the present  moment all at once as ‘this object’. Intrinsic to this ‘all
at once’ ensemble,  giving it its unity as gestalt, is a dimension common to each part but not
reducible to it, a centering identity of the whole configuration both belonging to each part but
beyond each particular: A gestalt system is “a signification common to an ensemble of molecular
facts, which is expressed by all the facts and which is not contained completely in any one of
them.”(Merleau-Ponty 1967,  p.143).    Merleau-Ponty makes internally centered structure 
irreducible. Gestalt is a founding configuration of experience.
Merleau-Ponty sees intersubjectivity as a simultaneous configuration of parts just as he does
perception of objects.  Sense always co-implies body, and subjectivity belongs to
intersubjectivity. Being in the world for Merleau-Ponty is  occupying a position within a shared
gestalt (the same world  for everyone).  I am primordially situated in an intersubjective world.
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intersubjectivity is driven by  his founding of the temporal ‘now’
structure as an irreducible gestalt field.
How does Kelly’s approach differ from Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal intersubjective model? To
begin with, Kelly’s model of psychological movement unravels the notion of a gestalt 
background field of meaning framing a  foreground. The construct  replaces figure and
background field with  a referential  dimension  whose two poles together comprise a single
unitary sense of meaning. The idea I am advancing is of the irreducible ‘now’ of temporality as a
differential SENSE rather than a composed  field , body or pattern. In order to get a sense of the
difference between Kelly’s starting point in a bipolar referential differential and Merleau-Ponty’s
configurational grounding, we have to think of Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt structure as over- stuffed.
Merleau-Ponty means to make the configurational ensemble  an absolute, irreducible beginning,
but what he conceives as primordial may be seen from a wholly different vantage as a derived
abstraction of a more intricate, insubstantial beginning. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s irreducible gestalt perceptual organization, the whole gives birth  to each of
the parts,  but it does so, not as a history formed out of its elements over time, but
simultaneously,  equally to all. When I see this textured shape in front of me at this instant of
time as a unity of mutually configured elements, each part is dependent on the SAME genesis,
and because each part is at the same time different from each other, this comes down to  saying
that, in a single moment of perception,  these senses are independent of each other even as they
are  united by the whole.  In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s dependent pieces of a whole function
as a plurality of related independent parts. The thinking of plural structure as a simultaneous
spatial unity implies a multiplicity of  parts or senses (even if completely  dependent on the
whole),  captured  in that present instant of the now that is sandwiched between retention and
protention. 
Whereas Merleau-Ponty finds it necessary to begin from configurational structure in order to
assure that an element of meaning is carved out of otherness rather than solipsist positivity, the
construct as an irreducible WAY of likeness and difference is a sense  of meaning that is so
minimal that it has no patterned  or configured internality, no properties, or textures within itself. 
It has no essential internal valuative  content beyond what is necessary to distinguish it from
other meanings.  Everything that we associate with affectively and cognitively relevant and
significant meaning is dependent on process, on how intimately,  multidimensionally  and
assimilatively we embrace new experience, and none of it on content. It is true that a construct’s
bipolar ‘way’ of sense acts as  a unique node of relational possibilities and constraints, otherwise
there would be no benefit to re-construing meanings. But it is the organizational integrity and
coherence of the relations that constructs afford that give us our passions, our loves and hates and
ambitions, not the valuative content of their internal sense. For instance, the construct freedom vs
security demonstrates its usefulness, meaningfulness and contribution to our happiness via its
effectiveness at relating to and interpreting new experience replicatively, assimilatively, and not
in any extent because of what it means ‘in itself’. 
The consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s derived starting point is that it masks a more fundamental, 
intricate and intimate notion of movement and relationality beneath a dynamic that is at the same 
time too fat with content, and too resistant to change, and on the other hand too polarizing in its 
transitions. The  ‘overstuffed’  content inserted into the tripartite structure  of  temporality makes 
Merleau-Ponty‘s gestalt model and related embodied approaches targets of Kelly’s critique of 
push and pull psychologies as being  beholden to inner  and outer  demons.
 “...to allow ourselves to become preoccupied with independent forces, socio-dynamics, 
psychodynamics, leprechaun theory, demonology, or stimulus-response mechanics, is to lose 
sight of the essential feature of the whole human enterprise.”(Kelly 1969e)”
 Heidegger offers a particularly compelling  complement  to the approach I am imputing to Kelly. 
Heidegger preceded  Kelly in doing away with categorical distinctions between affect, willing
and cognition. Like Kelly, he begins not from bodily ensembles but a simple differential,  what in
Being and Time he calls variously and equi-primordially Temporality ,  the ontological difference
and  Care. What are traditionally divided up into sensation, perception, cognition, and affect and
motivation  are united for Heidegger as temporality. Understanding is the cognate aspect, and
Befindlichkeit, which literally translates as ‘self-findingness’, but has frequently been defined as
affective  ‘attunement, is the motivational-affective aspect of experiencing. 
While Kelly emphasizes that we find ourselves always already in motion, already thrown  into
the midst of constantly changing contexts of experience, Heidegger makes clearer both the sense
of active , willful decision and choice, and passivity indissociable in every moment, showing that
in finding ourselves in action, we are ‘thrown’ into the world, we ‘fall prey to’ what we 
anticipatingly project ahead of ourselves as new experience. Choice, voluntary action and will are
active in that we anticipate ahead, but are equally passive in that we fall prey to, are surprised by,
thrown into, must adapt to the foreign aspect of what we anticipate ourselves into via construing.
Kelly(1955) acknowledges this foreign aspect of all events when he points that, while a construct
abstracts the aspect of likeness between a present event and a previous one,  this also implies a
way in which a new event differs from previous happenings. 
“When we say that two things are ‘alike’ or ‘identical’, we obviously mean that they are alike in
some particular way or ways, but, of course, never in every way... there has to be some
distinguishing feature between them, else they would not be two separate events in the first place.
..likeness always implies a difference.”
A paradoxical implication of a radical temporal grounding of experience is that it is at the same
time more fully in motion and transition than embodied models, and maintains a more intimate
and intricate thread of self-continuity and self-belonging.  Heidegger understands that to be
radically, irreducibly, primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed , at every moment, a
world that feelingly, creatively impinges on me anew as foreign in some aspect.  And it is
simultaneously, to feel a belonging familiarity) to what impinges on me in its foreignness due to
the anticipative, projective futural aspect of temporality. Reminiscent of Kelly’s replicative
anticipatory process , Heidegger’s being-in -the world is always characterized by a pragmatic
self-belongingness that he articulates as a   heedful circumspective relevance  that events always
have for Dasein in its world.
Heidegger(2010) writes: 
"In its familiar being-in-relevance, understanding holds itself before that disclosure as that within
which its reference moves. Understanding can itself be referred in and by these relations. We
shall call the relational character of these referential relations signifying. In its familiarity with
these relations, Da-sein "signifies" to  itself. It primordially gives itself to understand its being
and potentiality-of-being with regard to its being-in-the-world. The for-the-sake-of-which
signifies an in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a what-in of
letting something be relevant, and the latter a what-with of relevance. These relations are
interlocked among themselves as a primordial totality. They are what they are as this signifying
in which Da-sein gives itself to understand its being-in-the-world beforehand. We shall call this
relational totality of signification  significance. It is what constitutes the structure of the world, of
that in which Da-sein as such always already is.”
Note: Although his work is beyond the scope  of this paper, Derrida’s differance is allied with 
the referential-differential structure of  Heidegger’s Dasein.
“...there is no experience consisting of pure presence but only of chains of differential marks.”
“The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account
that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other
elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is
differential, within each individual "element" as well as between "elements", because it splits
each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the
remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence; it is a differential
structure escaping the logic of presence..(Derrida 198,  p.53)”
Kelly on Role, the Social and Validation
An important implication of the difference between  grounding experience in a gestalt field and
situating it as a bipolar  referential differential can be demonstrated by comparing Kelly’s idea of
the social with Merleau-Ponty’s. I mentioned that for Merleau-Ponty, the person cannot be
extracted from a social ensemble any more than the figure of a perceptual object can be
understood apart from its ground. For Merleau-Ponty, when a gestalt configuration changes, even
though it is true that all the elements comprising  that configuration   are altered, there is really
only one change, that of the field as an irreducible totality. If the elements of that field are
persons , then in intersubjective communication each participant’s alteration is an aspect of the
total change in the social configuration. There is one change, that of the totality, and each person
is only an element of that change. As  Merleau-Ponty says:”as the parts of my body together
comprise a system, so my body and the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same
phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace
henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.”(P. Of Perception, p.412)
 Merleau-Ponty  writes:
 ” My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape; and Paul’s finger, which
is pointing out  the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as orientated  towards a
church-tower-for-me, it is Paul’s finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul sees, just as,
conversely, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I do not
imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely
analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul’s world and guide his gaze.
When I think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the
medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a living experience of the same world as mine, as
well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that
history.”(Phenomenology of Perception, p.471)
 “ In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common
ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor
are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which
neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of
behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate
reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. In the
present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person’s thoughts are certainly his; they are not of
my making, though I do grasp them the moment they come into being, or even anticipate them. And
indeed, the objection which my interlocutor raises to what I say draws from me thoughts which I had no
idea I possessed, so that at the same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think
too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able
to reintegrate it into my life and make of it an episode in my private history”. (Phenomenology of
Perception, p.413))
Butt (1998a) concurs with Merleau-Ponty that "sociality can be seen as more primitive for
humankind than individuality, when our status as body-subjects is appreciated and dualist ideas
are abandoned.”
By sociality, Butt means  joint ownership of meaning, which he opposes to the cognitivist
presumption of a computer-like subject controlling their own thoughts.
Chiari(2015) adds: “In other words, it is possible to conceive the relationship between two or
more persons not in terms of "interacting" individuals, but of elements of an inseparable system
in which the relationship precedes the individual psychologies.”
Along similar lines, but from a realist rather than postmodern  perspective, Harry Procter has
proposed  the heuristic of a ‘family construct system’, wherein relationship dynamics among the
individual members of a family function comparably to the elements
of an individual’s personal construct system.
Shaun Gallagher(2017), a writer embracing hermeneutic as well as Merleau-Ponty themes, offers
a co-conditioning model of sociality that accords with Butt’s depiction of construing as
intersubjective:
On ‘socially distributed cognition’, he writes:
“To the extent that the instituted narrative, even if formed over time by many individuals,
transcends those individuals and may persist beyond them, it may loop around to constrain or
dominate the group members or the group as a whole.” 
“Collective (institutional, corporate) narratives often take on a life (an autonomy)
of their own and may come to oppose or undermine the intentions of the individual
members. Narrative practices in both extended institutional and collective structures and
practices can be positive in allowing us to see certain possibilities, but at the same time, they
can carry our cognitive processes and social interactions in specific directions and blind us
to other possibilities."
 
The above treatments of the social space as centered configuration makes individual behavior in
social situations the product of narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social
constraints. The presupposition here is the belief that essentially the same social signs are
available to all who interrelate within a particular community, that there are such things as
non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency. I’m not
suggesting that joint activity implies a complete fusion of horizons amenable to a third-person
perspective, except perhaps in the case of  Procter’s group construct system. Rather , the
first-personal  stance becomes subordinated to a second-personal ‘we’, as “an inseparable system
in which the relationship precedes the individual psychologies.” 
This is not to say that these  accounts deny any role to individual psychological history in the
reception of social signs, only that intersubjectivity is characterized by a   reciprocal cobbling and
co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints’ of such interactive
bodily-mental and social practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common
to other participants in my community.
Merleau-Ponty(1962) writes “Although [the other’s] consciousness and mine, working through
our respective situations, may contrive to produce a common situation in which they can
communicate, it is nevertheless from the subjectivity of each of us that each one projects this
‘one and only’ world.”
Chiairi (2015) believes that Kelly, too, understood  intersubjectivity as an inseparable second-
person system. 
 “ If in Kelly an explicit consideration of role relationships from an intersubjective viewpoint is 
missing, the importance he attaches to intersubjectivity and inter-corporeality can be easily  
inferred from the value he gives to certain psychotherapeutic techniques having the structure of  
role playing – in particular, fixed-role therapy and enactment. The assumption for their utilization 
in psychotherapy beside the therapeutic conversation rests on the above consideration of the 
construction process as a social process, rather than as a mere individual and intellectual
operation.” 
The following comment by Kelly would seem to provide evidence in favor of  Chiari’s 
interpretation of personal construct theory as a  psychology of irreducible  intersubjectivity.    
 “To suggest that each man contrives his own system and plots events within it is not to say 
that each of us is bottled up forever in his own private world. Different men can construe the 
same events, though each starts out by doing it in his own way. Two people, say a mother and a 
newborn child, may not have a full intellectual meeting of minds the first time they try to enter 
into a discourse with each other in the maternity ward. But by sharing their encounter with 
events-including the events produced by their own behavior-some mothers and daughters do 
develop a fair understanding, each of what the other is talking about. Each may rely upon her 
own system, but the constructs of one system can be devised to plot the approximate positions of 
those of the other. Children and men, therefore, cease to be altogether alone when they try to see 
events through the spectacles others use, even while reserving the privilege of using their own. “ 
(Kelly 1969c)
But I think Kelly’s perspective on sociality departs in significant ways from Chiari’s reading of
it. The ‘meeting of minds’ Kelly is describing above, it seems to me, is of the order of a
superficial or incidental construing, similar to Kelly’s depiction of drivers attempting to
anticipate the behavior of fellow drivers in traffic. For Kelly , the extent to which meaning
appears to be reciprocally shaped is in inverse proportion to the superordinacy of the kind of
social meaning involved. In other words, the sorts of situations where persons seem to succeed at
negotiating a shared basis of understanding are likely to involve superficial matters, such as
traffic navigation, where only a superficial understanding of others behavior is required. 
Such phenomena as joint attention, distributed cognition and collective intention only  appear to
involve shared meanings and feelings when we view them from the most general, abstractive 
perspective. That way, the appearance of a shared experience masks the interpersonal differences
in interpretive  meaning of the event.
“There are different levels at which we can construe what other people are thinking. In driving
down the highway, for example, we stake our lives hundreds of times a day on our accuracy in
predicting what the drivers of the oncoming cars will do. The orderly, extremely complex, and
precise weaving of traffic is really an amazing example of people predicting each other’s
behavior through subsuming each other’s perception of a situation. Yet actually each of us knows
very little about the higher motives and the complex aspirations of the oncoming drivers, upon
whose behavior our own lives depend. It is enough, for the purpose of avoiding collisions, that
we understand or subsume only certain specific aspects of their construction systems.
If we are to understand them at higher levels, we must stop traffic and get out to talk with them.
If we can predict accurately what others will do, we can adjust ourselves to their behavior. If
others know how to tell what we will do, they can adjust themselves to our behavior and may
give us the right of way.  This mutual adjustment to each other’s viewpoint takes place, in the
terms of the theory of personal constructs, because, to some extent, our construction system
subsumes the construction systems of others and theirs, in part, subsume ours. Understanding
does not have to be a one-way proposition; it can be mutual. For the touch and go of traffic it is
not necessary for the motorists to have an extensive mutual understanding of each other’s ways
of seeing things but, within a restricted range and at the concrete level of specific acts
represented by traffic, the mutual understandings must be precise.  
For the more complicated interplay of roles—for example, for the husband-and-wife
interplay—the understanding must cover the range of domestic activities at least, and must reach
at least a level of generality which will enable the participants to predict each other’s behavior in
situations not covered by mere household traffic rules.”
A key to explaining  the resistance of a  person’s system to fusion within a social ensemble is
understanding the role of validation in reacting to the behavior of others, Kelly says that in
forming my social role, I use others’ behavior as a source of validational evidence. I think this
points to quite different implications than what is implied by being co-conditioned by one’s
interaction with others’ behavior in Merleau-Ponty’s sense.
 Kelly(1961) writes:
“In some respects validation in personal construct theory takes the place of reinforcement,
although it is a construct of quite a different order, Validation is the relationship one senses
between anticipation and realization, whereas in conventional theory reinforcement is a value
property attributed to an event.” 
The relevance here for  embodied intersubjective approaches following Merleau-Ponty is that,
while these approaches reject stimulus-response reinforcement models,  their construal of social
relations in terms of semi-arbitrary reciprocal shapings requires that the value properties of
mutually negotiated social events  play as much of a role in affecting individuals as does the
integrity of the relation (anticipatory dynamics) between that event and the subject.  
In order to understand the crucial distinction between using the social sphere as validational
evidence and having one’s behavior normatively shaped in joint action, we have to keep in mind
that the meaning of validation is closely tied to the replicative anticipatory aim of the construct
system. However directly I attempt to connect with a world of fellow persons, each with their
own subjective systems, all I can ever experience of that otherness is what I anticipatively,
replicatively construe as consonant with my own system.  As participant in an intersubjective
community my construals  frame and orient my reciprocal interactions with others in such a way
that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through and organizes it. That is to say, hidden
within the naive exteriority of my social encounters is a peculiar sort of coherence or implicate
self-consistency.
In Kelly’s approach,  even when someone lives in a culture which is tightly conformist, one
neither   passively  absorbs, nor jointly negotiates  the normative practices of that culture, but
validates one’s own construction of the world using the resources of that culture. 
“Perhaps we can see that it is not so much that the culture has forced conformity upon him as it is
that his validational material is cast in terms of the similarities and contrasts offered within and
between segments of his culture. “ (Kelly 1955, p. 93). 
“It may be difficult to follow this notion of culture as a validational system of events. And it may
be even more difficult to reconcile with the idea of cultural control what we have said about man
not being the victim of his biography. The cultural control we see is one which is within the
client’s own construct system and it is imposed upon him only in the sense that it limits the kinds
of evidence at his disposal. How he handles this evidence is his own affair, and clients manage it
in a tremendous variety of ways.”
One can see how the ‘tremendous variety of ways’ that participants are capable of interpreting
the ‘same’ cultural milieu makes any attempt to apply a  group -centered account of social
understanding pointless.
Kelly(1955) says: “You can say [a person] is what he is because of his cultural context. This is to
say that the environment assigns him his role, makes him good or bad by contrast, appropriates
him to itself, and, indeed, his whole existence makes sense only in terms of his relationship to the
times and the culture. This is not personal construct theory...”
Kelly (1955) opposes personal construct theory to perspectives which see a person “helplessly
suspended in his culture, and is swept along with the tides of social  change”. 
“....no  psychologist, I think, is all that he might be until he has undertaken to join the child's
most audacious venture beyond the frontiers of social conventions and to share its most
unexpected outcomes.”
Kelly’s Sociality Corollary (“to the extent that one person construes the construction processes of
another, he may play a role in a social process involving the other person”)  spells out the
organizational implications of a  being-with-others defined and validated by the  intimate
assimilative processes of replicative  anticipation. 
To construe another’s construction processes is to subsume them as variants of one’s own
system.  To the extent that one is successful, one will have embedded  one functionally integral
theme( the other person’s outlook)  within another( one’s superordinate system. ). If both parties
are successful, is  there then  an overlap of horizons, as  Barison (1990) writes?
 “ In hermeneutic dialogue there are not a subject and an object, but there is the encounter of two
horizons, which combine with each other in a new horizon, formed by a change of both of them
in the moment of interpretation.”   (Barison,  F.  (1990).  La  psichiatria  tra  ermeneutica  ed 
epistemologia [Psychiatry  between  hermeneutics and epistemology]. Comprendre, 5, 27-33)
This  meeting of minds is not a fusion or even overlapping of themes, the other’s and my own.
Rather, the two persons remain distinct but related worlds of thinking. Since there is no actual
point of contact between construction systems, only each person’s version of the other’s world,
there would be no overarching vantage point from which to glimpse anything like a  unified
group dynamic  or Merleau-Ponty’s  ‘ same world’ . My ability to enter into second person
‘I-Thou’ relations with another presupposes and is a derivative of my first personal stance.  The
relationship is not a single entity preceding my individual psychology, it is my version of the 
relationship alongside the other’s version of the ‘same’ relationship, and this must be multiplied
by the number of participants in a community. 
It is true that each party’s participation in interaction changes the other’s way of being, but the
question is whether there is not an underlying thematic consistency that is maintained in each
person throughout all their interactions , a  self-consistency that resists being usurped by a larger
self-other ‘system’.  For Kelly a mutuality, fusion, jointness cannot be assumed simply because
each party is in responsive communication with the other. One party can be affected by the
interaction by succeeding in subsuming the other’s perspective and as a result  feeling an intimate
and empathetic bond with the other. At the same time, in the same ‘joint’ encounter, the other
party may become more and more alienated from the first , having failed to subsume the first
party’s system and finding the first party to be angering, upsetting and threatening.
In both situations of superficial mutual understanding and those where core role meanings are
involved, those that pertain to issues deeply important to a person, a ‘meeting of minds’ is not a
matter of shared understanding in the sense of a same or similar meaning becoming disseminated
among the members of the group. Instead, effective social understanding requires the successful
subsuming of each other’s  construct systems by each participant in the group.  When I subsume
another’s outlook within my system, for instance as a therapist understanding a client , or a
parent dealing with a young child, I am not converging on the same or similar way of
looking at the world as the other. My system may remain very different from theirs as I
understand them from within my own vantage point.  
“One person may understand another better than he is understood. He may understand more of
the other’s ways of looking at things. A therapist-client relationship is one which exemplifies
greater understanding on the part of one member than on the part of the other.” (Kelly 1955)
Kelly says:
“...for people to be able to understand each other it takes more than a similarity or commonality
in their thinking. In order for people to get along harmoniously with each other, each must have
some understanding of the other. This is different from saying that each must understand things
in the same way as the other.”
“In order to play a constructive role in relation to another person one must not only, in some
measure, see eye to eye with him but must, in some measure, have an acceptance of him and of
his way of seeing things. We say it in another way: the person who is to play a constructive role
in a social process with another person need not so much construe things as the other person does
as he must effectively construe the other person’s outlook...social psychology must be a
psychology of interpersonal understandings, not merely a psychology of common
understandings.” 
Acceptance for Kelly does not simply mean being genuinely open and receptive to engaging with
another person. Openness does not by itself produce an intimate connection with them; to
achieve this one must be able to follow their way of thinking, from their vantage, but interpreted
via one’s own outlook. Gabriele Chiari describes Kellyian social interaction as “joint action” but
this is misleading. The first party can construe the second party  more effectively than the other
way around, by more effectively subsuming the second party’s construction system.  This
asymmetry is revealed when one allows the social to begin from within each person’s system
rather than BETWEEN them. Heidegger’s Being-with-others, like Kelly’s notion of sociality,
when understood via the mode of  authentic thinking, deconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s primary
intersubjectivity. Gallagher(2010) acknowledges Heidegger’s departure from Merleau-Ponty’s
account , without seeming to grasp how the inherent sociality of Dasein exposes Gallagher’s
concept of primary intersubjectivity as a derived abstraction. “In Heidegger, and in thinkers who
follow his line of thought, we find the idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied,
expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements with the world can be given prior to or without
reference to intersubjectivity.”  Dasein’s ownmost possibilities of being would be leveled down
and obscured if the relation to others were forced into the mode of thinking of joint action.
But let’s not misunderstand what I mean by making this distinction between a WITHIN-person
and a BETWEEN-person dynamic. The within-person dynamic is already a between in that it is a
thoroughgoing exposure to, and continuous self-transformation via an outside, an alterity, an
otherness. For Kelly and Heidegger, the radically inseparable interaffecting between my history
and new experience exposes me to the world, and modifies who I am, in an immediate, constant
and thoroughgoing manner. I am not arguing that the meaning of social cues is simply
person-specific rather than located intersubjectively as an impersonal expressive agency. Before
there is a pre-reflective personal ‘I’ or interpersonal ‘we’, there is already within what would be
considered THE person a fully social site of simultaneously subjective and objective process
overtaking attempts to understand human action based on either within-person constancies or
between-person conditionings.
 “... each of us represents a rather large chunk of his own environment”(Kelly 1969h).
So, rather than a retreat  from a thoroughgoing notion of sociality, Personal construct theory
would be a re-situating of the site of the social as a more originary and primordial grounding than
that of the over-determined abstractions represented by  discursive intersubjectivities. Those
larger patterns of human belonging abstracted from local joint activity, which Merleau-Ponty’s
intercorporeal approach discerns in terms of cultural language practices,  hide within themselves
a more primary patterning. While our experience as individuals is characterized by stable
relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site
of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within
which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar within-person continuity. It also has a
character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand
human action based on between-person configurations or fields. We may identify to a greater or
lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining
values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at
the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as
much as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can
perceive a locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive
conversation. To find common ground in  a polarized political environment is not to find an
intersect among combatants, a centrifugal ground of commonality, but to find as many intersects
as there are participants. Each person perceives the basis of the commonality in the terms of their
own construct system.
In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity organizing
their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can be said to
influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as `determined' by
his response, and his ideas are not simply `shaped' by my contribution to our correspondence.   
The extent to which I could be said to be embedded within a particular set of cultural practices
would be a function of how closely other persons I encounter resonate with my own ongoing
experiential process. I can only shape my action to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted
institutionalized  forms to the extent that those goals or forms are already implicated in my
ongoing experiential movement. Even then, what is implicated for me is not `the' social forms, but
aspects hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to the organizational structure of my
construct system; what I perceive as socially `permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already
stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual
who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's
functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they
believe that in moving forward in life their behavior is guided by the constraints imposed by
essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their  community.
Autopoietic Systems: Temporality as Reciprocal Causality 
  
In order to give a better sense of the important differences that separate the radically temporal 
perspectives of Kelly and Heidegger  from Merleau-Ponty’s brand of intersubjectivity,  I want to
turn my attention to writers who have adapted  his ideas in a naturalistic direction. This group
includes Radcliffe, Gallagher , Maturana and Varela. Chiari offers what he calls a hermeneutic
constructivist narrative interpretation of Kelly, which he believes “shows striking similarities“
with Maturana and  Varela’s autopoietic approach and with Heidegger.  Their “ontology of the
observer is  in line with a constructivism of hermeneutic type, and which shows  aspects of
similarity with Heidegger’s hermeneutics (Winograd & Flores, 1986). Recently, I tried  to show
the many aspects of similarity between the theory of autopoiesis and the very PCT” (Chiari,
2016). 
I believe that, while autopoietic self-organizing systems approaches share with personal construct
theory the conviction that  meanings are the product of construction rather than objective
representation( Chiari (2015) gives a helpful summary of their commonalities), they fall
significantly short of it with regard to their understanding of the relation between affect and
intention, and the structure of sociality. Specifically, I argue that they allow internal affective and
external social influences to shape the person in polarizing ways that violate the intimate sense of
Kelly’s replicative construing. As was the case with Merleau-Ponty, the issue comes down to the
internal structuration of temporality. Is the basis of change within a bodily organization,
interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself,  the function of a
collision between  a separately constituted subjective context and present objects, or is it instead
an interweaving of a subject and object already changed by each other, radically interbled or
interaffected, as referential differential? I contend that for Varela and Thompson it is the former,
that they conceive the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of subject and object as a conjunction of
separate, adjacent moments. I am not suggesting that these phases are considered as unrelated,
only that they each are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities. 
This thematic appears within Varela and Thompson’s psychological approach as a linkage of 
self-affection to an embodied neural organization of reciprocally causal relations among 
non-decoupleable parts or sub-processes. Varela’s autopoietic system  is a reciprocal system of
contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and socially
embedded, in continuous inter-relational motion . It is founded on interactions among
innumerable, dumb bits which may only exist for an instant of time. But this  seemingly
insignificant property of stasis built into these dumb bits of a dynamical, embodied and 
embedded ecological system expresses itself at a macro level as homunculi-like schemes, 
assemblies and narratives (sensory-motor, emotive, perceptual, conceptual and interpersonal) 
whose creative interplay and thematic consistency may be restricted by the presumption of a 
distinction between their existence and interaction. I contend that the temporality underlying
Varela’a naturalized inter-subjectivity conceives the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of past and
present as a  conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the
present entity  or event, and the present object which supplements that past. I am not suggesting
that these  phases are considered as unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their
own  temporary identities.  
While these components interact constantly (Varela(1999b) says “.in brain and behavior there is
never a stopping or dwelling cognitive state, but only permanent change punctuated by transient
[stabilities] underlying a momentary act”(p.291) , it doesn’t seem as if one could go so far as to
claim that the very SENSE of each participant in a neural organization is intrinsically and
immediately dependent on the meanings of the others. I suggest it would be more accurate to
claim that each affects and is affected by the others as a collision of temporary bodies.
Varela(1999a) offers "lots of simple agents having simple properties  may be brought together,
even in a haphazard way, to give rise to what appears to an observer as  a purposeful and
integrated whole"(p.52 ). The bare existence of each of these agents may be  said to PRECEDE its
interaction with other agents, in that each agent occupies and inheres in its  own state, presenting
its own instantaneous properties for a moment, apart from, even as it is  considered conjoined to,
the context which conditions it and the future which is conditioned by it.  
Perhaps I am misreading Varela and other enactivist proponents . Am I saying that these  
contemporary accounts necessarily disagree with Merleau-Ponty’s(1968) critique of the idea of  
the object-in-itself?  
...the identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of its own, of  rest in itself,
that plenitude and that positivity that we have recognized in it already  exceed the experience, are
already a second interpretation of the experience...we  arrive at the thing-object, at the In Itself, at
the thing identical with itself, only by  imposing upon experience an abstract dilemma which
experience ignores(p.162).  
On the contrary, as different as Merleau-Ponty’s and various enactivist accounts may be in other  
respects, it seems me that they share a rejection of the idea of a constituted subjectivity  
encountering and representing an independent in-itself. In fact, the suggestion of such an
orientation is precisely what  concerns  them about Kelly’s terminology. In a very general sense,
what is articulated by Varela, Gallagher  and others as the reciprocal, non-decoupleable
interconnections within a dynamical ecological  system functions for Merleau-Ponty as the ‘flesh’
of the world; the site of reciprocal  intertwining between an In Itself and a For Itself, subject and
object, consciousness and the pre-noetic, activity and passivity, the sensible and the sentient, the
touching and the touched.
My  point is that current accounts may also have in common with Merleau-Ponty the belief that  
subjective context and objective sense reciprocally determine each other as an oppositional  
relation or communication (Merleau-Ponty calls it an abyss, thickness or chiasm) between  
discrete, temporary and contingent contents. “...that difference without contradiction, that 
divergence between the within and without ... is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of 
communication (Merleau-Ponty 1968 ,p.135).”  
By contrast, I am arguing that for Kelly the ‘now’ structure of a construed event is not an
intertwining relation  between contingent, non-decoupleable identities, states, phases, ensembles,
but a radical differential intersecting  implicating a different understanding of psychological
movement; intentional object and background context are not adjacent regions(a within and a
without) in space or time; they have already been contaminated by each other such that they are
inseparably co-implied as a single edge (Try to imagine separating the ‘parts’ of an edge.
Attempting to do so only conjures a new edge ). The current context of an event is not a system of
relations between entities, states, patterns, but a nearly content-free indivisible gesture of passage,
what Kelly describes as a referential axis, or construct.
 Varela , Ratcliffe and Zahavi vs Kelly on Affect and Intention 
We may gain a better understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of the split between state
and function, content and change instantiated in enactive accounts by investigating their treatment
of the relation between affectivity and intention.
One of the most striking features of Kelly’s theory is his declaration that “the classical threefold
division of psychology into cognition, affection, and conation has been completely abandoned in
the psychology of personal constructs. “(Kelly 1955) .It is not that affect, emotion and intention
vanish from personal construct theory , but rather that Kelly finds a way to  integrate the aspects
of behavior these terms point to. Understanding how Kelly accomplishes this is essential  for
grasping the basis  of the personal construct, and for recognizing how embodied approaches fall
short in this regard.  It is not as if embodied accounts follow first generation cognitivism in
repeating ‘Descartes’ error’ , to borrow Damasio’s phrase, by considering thought and feeling  to
be functionally  independent. On the contrary,  these writers take pains to present emotion and
thought as an indissociable interaction. They insist that cognitive and affective processes are
closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at
multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world , and that
affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As Ratcliffe(2002) puts it, “moods are no longer
a subjective window-dressing on privileged theoretical perspectives but a background that
constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether theoretical or practical”(p.290). In affecting
reason, feeling affects itself.
A comparison with Kelly’s approach to subjectivity, however, reveals that, unlike Kelly , they can
hardly be said to have dispensed with the divide between thought and feeling. To see why this is
so, I would like to focus on Zahavi’s phenomenological reading of the relation between feeling
and thinking. While Zahavi’s position is only one among a variety of proposed solutions to the
problem of subjective awareness among embodied perspectives, I mention it here because I think
it  spotlights a fundamental theoretical weakness common to hermeneutic , enactivist, and certain
phenomenological writers,  including Scheler, Stein, Henry,  Zahavi and Sartre, with regard to the
integration of feeling and intention. 
Zahavi , like Kelly, recognizes the subjectively  personal nature of experiencing. Referencing 
Nagel’s argument that there is something it is like to be a conscious entity,  Zahavi insists that
consciousness of anything  always includes a dimension of ‘for-meness’. (Variants of this idea
include Goldie’s feeling towards, Thompson’s pre-intentional reflexive awareness and Ratcliffe’s
existential feeling.) In attempting to account for the subjective dimension of awareness, 
Zahavi argues that the for-meness of consciousness in its most primordial form manifests as a
self-affecting pre-reflective minimal self-awareness. He  contrasts this subjective self-experience
with the apprehension of objects. In the latter act, I attend  to, intend, reflect or introspect on an
entity. In doing so, the world that I experience appears to me over a divide, is indirect, mediated,
alienated. 
Zahavi posits that my awareness of myself, however, cannot fundamentally be comparable to my
experience of an object. For one thing, if it were  mediated in this same way it would lead  to an
infinite regress. The  I that views my subjectivity implies another I that experiences this I, and so
on. Even more damaging to the claim that self-awareness is the intending of an object is that it
presupposes what it is designed to explain. ”..a mental state cannot  be imbued with for-me-ness
simply as a result of being the object of a further mental state. Rather, if  awareness of awareness
is to give rise to for-me-ness, “the first order state” must already be “imbued  with some
phenomenally apparent quality of mine-ness” (Howell and Thompson 2017)
To avoid the specter of an infinite regress, the subjective pole of intentional awareness must be of
a qualitatively different nature than the object pole, goes Zahavi’s argument. He explains that the
pre-reflective self-awareness  that opposes, but is at the same time inseparably connected with
intended objects, is a peculiar sort of experience, something of the order of a feeling rather than an
objective sense. 
Zahavi(1999)approvingly cites the phenomenonologist  Michel Henry’s view:
“When we are in pain, anxious, embarrassed, stubborn or happy, we do not feel it through the
intervention of a (inner) sense organ or an intentional act, but are immediately aware of it. There
is no distance or separation between the feeling of pain or happiness and our awareness of it, since
it is given in and through itself. According to Henry, something similar holds for all of our
conscious experiences. To make use of a terminology taken from analytical philosophy of mind,
Henry would claim that all conscious experiences are essentially characterized by having a
subjective ‘feel’ to them, that is, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’”.
I want to take note of the fact that Zahavi treats both the subjective and the objective sides of 
intentionality as self-inhering interiorities, states, identities, before they are poles of a relation.  
Because he makes self-inhering content do most of the work of establishing the  awareness
of the affectively felt and objectively perceived sides of the bond between  the subject and the
world, the relation between subject and object becomes a mostly empty middle term, a neutral
copula added onto the two opposing sides of the binary. In settling on feeling as a special sort of
entity that does the work of generating immediate self-awareness , Zahavi is harking  back to a
long-standing  Western tradition connecting affect, feeling and emotion with movement , action,
dynamism, motivation and change.  Affect is supposedly instantaneous, non-mediated experience.
It has been said that ‘raw' or primitive feeling  is  bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and
non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation,  innate, qualitative, passive, a surge, glow, twinge,
energy, spark, something we are overcome by. Opposed to such ‘bodily’, dynamical events are
seemingly flat, static entities referred to by such terms as  mentation  , rationality, theorization,
propositionality, objectivity,  calculation, cognition, conceptualization and perception.  
For Kelly,  these dichotomous features: hedonic versus reflective, voluntary versus involuntary,
conceptual versus bodily-affective, are not effectively understood as   belonging to interacting
states of being; they are instead the inseparable features of a unitary differential structure of
transition, otherwise known as a construct. In personal construct theory, there are no self-inhering
entities, neither in the guise of affects nor intended objects. In the place of Zahavi’s three-part
structure of subjective feeling, relational bond and intentional object, Kelly proposes a two-part
structure manifested by the bi-polar construct.  For Kelly subjective affect and objective intention
are equi-primordial features of a construct’s referential differential hinge. Put differently, every
construed event is already both feeling and object of sense. This being the case, there is no
synthetic relational connector needed  to tie subject and object together.
Heidegger’s approach complements Kelly’s. He critiques Western notions of propositional 
relation as external bond, tracing it back to Aristotle.  As an "ontologically insufficient
interpretation of the logos", what the mode of interpretation of propositional statement doesn't
understand about itself is that thinking of itself as external 'relating' makes the propositional 'is' an
inert synthesis, and conceals its ontological basis as attuned, relevant taking of 'something AS
something'. In accordance with this affected-affecting care structure, something is understood
WITH REGARD TO something else. This means that it is taken together with it, but not in the
manner of a synthesizing relating.” Instead, taking something as something means transforming
what one apprehends in the very act of apprehension. This integral structure  of self-
temporalization implies equi-primordially and inseparably affective (Befindlichkeit) and
intentional-cognitive aspects.
From  Kelly’s and Heidegger’s perspectives, Zahavi’s concerns about an infinite regress is a
byproduct  of the way the issue of subjectivity is being formulated, and Zahavi s solution only
reaffirms the problem, which is that the affective and cognate aspects of events are artificially split
into separated entities, and then have to be pieced together again in an interaction . To  ground
experience in radical temporality is to abandon the concept of subject and world in states of
interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming
movement.The functioning of a construct within a hierarchical system allows Kelly to maintain
along with Zahavi that one is intrinsically self-aware in every construal, whether that construction
is specifically directed toward the self or an event in the world. But unlike for Zahavi, the self 
component of awareness is not a self-inhering feeling state. Rather, the ‘for-meness’ aspect of a
construed  event is the contribution my construct system as a unified whole makes to the
discernment of a new event in terms of likeness and difference with respect to  my previous
experience. In other words,  the ‘background’ (contrast pole) against which a new event emerges
is not only a previously experienced subordinate element that the current event refers to, but it is
more broadly the superordinate system as a whole that participates in the construal in an implicit
sense. As discussed earlier in this paper, Kelly’s organization corollary indicates that the system is
functionally integral, which I interpret to mean that one’s superordinate outlook is  implicit in all
construals. 
Let’s see how Zahavi’s grounding of affect and intention in synthetic interaction between
subjective and objective self-inhering states realizes itself in the naturalized embodied models of
Varela and Ratcliffe. The general understanding Varela indicates of the relation between affective
movement and the thinking which it affects seems to depend on the idea of emotion as the change
of a temporarily persisting stance (scheme, state, dispositional attitude). Conceptual narratives are
assumed to have a self-perpetuating schematic tendency about them, requiring outside
intervention from time to time to produce qualitative change.
Varela(1999b) suggests that affective dynamics initiate gestalt shifts in thought and action. Unlike 
older views, for Varela intentionality is not assumed to rely on an outside mechanism in order to 
stir itself into motion. Nevertheless, cognition still relies on such intervention in order to 
significantly change its direction of movement. A person’s psychological processes cannot be
counted on to be intrinsically self-motivated in the  way that Kelly’s Choice corollary dictates, but
must be channelized into  changes in direction of action and conceptualization by extrinsic
motivating sources.  
Complementing Varela’s model, Ratcliffe’s notion of existential feeling founds affect and
intention as distinguishable structural aspects of a reciprocally causal model . Ratcliffe says
emotion and embodiment are “‘incorporated as essential components in cognition”, 
but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical; “...emotions and moods are not explicitly 
cognitive but neither are they independent of cognition”(Ratcliffe 2002, p.299). They originate as 
bodily sensations structuring cognition from outside of it. Emotion and cognition can 'conflict' and 
emotion can “override cognitive judgement”(p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran’s clinical 
observations of individuals with anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental information 
which contradicts an internally generated narrative. Ramachandran and Ratcliffe attribute this 
behavior to damage to connections between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe concludes 
from this that, in typically functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are presumed to
pack a contentful punch large enough to break through a psychological narrative's resistances
where weaker percepts from the environment cannot. 
It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe and Varela , intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of 
thought, but emotion, as conditioning valuative valence, provides the criteria for such processing. 
They are apparently not able to find the resources strictly within what they think of as intentional 
thought to de-center thinking processes, because they treat cognition as tending to form
temporarily self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the
world. So they rely on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the
stalled cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The mechanism of
emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and
meaning. 
In sum, affective and intentional situatedness, understood by Ratcliffe and Varela as globally
patterned inter-causal states (existential feeling), functions as a structure of entrenchment and self- 
conservation, inhering in itself and resisting its own transformation. A global change in bodily 
feeling is thus required to infuse supposedly stagnant affective-intentional narratives with a new 
direction and meaning, disrupt entrenched patterns, dissolve the conditioning glue holding them 
together, reveal their contingency and open up new possibilities. Interaffecting  causation, the 
glue that holds together Zahavi,  Ratcliffe and Varela’s minimal self, is a  secondary concept of
organization, a naturalized abstraction derived from the primary temporal structuration of
affectivity-intention.
The lesson that a comparison of Kelly and enactivist models teaches is that when dispositions to
act and acts themselves, being and becoming, feeling and intention, state  and function, body and
mind are treated as separate moments, then their relations are  rendered secondary and arbitrary,
requiring extrinsic causations  to piece them together.  What DeJaegher, critiquing Gallagher’s
primary intersubjectity account, writes in that narrower context, could apply more generally to
autopoietic and enactivist positions: “ first we carve nature up at artificial joints – we split mind
and body apart – and then we need to fasten the two together again, a task for which the notion of
embodiment is, according to Sheets-Johnstone’s assessment, used as a kind of glue . But glueing
the two back together does not bring back the original ‘‘integrity and nature of the whole”“ (De
Jaegher 2009, Sheets-Johnstone ,in press). 
Note:  Some in the personal construct theory community consider Kelly’s approach to be closely
aligned with John Dewey’s pragmatism, whose influence on personal construct theory Kelly
acknowledges,  but I think Dewey’s treatment of the relation between affect and  intention suffers
from the same  dualistic tendency as that of Zahavi, Ratcliffe  and Varela. 
The Unconscious vs Implicit Consciousness
In my investigation of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about inter-subjectivity, and embodied
naturalized approaches to affectivity, I have endeavored to show that the nature of movement in a
model of experience that places gestalt bodies, ensembles and fields as its irreducible basis is
inherently polarizing in its temporal transitions and relations. Relations in such a system rely on
the arbitrary valuative content of ensembles and fields to condition and reinforce bodily and social
practice. Merleau-Ponty characterizes this polarization  as the ‘ambiguity’ of being in the world,
which articulates itself as a post-Freudian repressed unconscious. Rather than  a Freudian ‘vertical
unconscious’ of hidden drives and desires within a psychic system, this would be a ‘horizontal
unconscious’ of a past, present and future which are not fully transparent to each other.
 
Fuchs, in ‘Body Memory and the Unconscious’, draws upon Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeal 
gestalt model to form his notion of the bodily unconscious:
“In body memory, the situations and actions experienced in the past are, as it were, all fused
together without any of them standing out individually. Through the repetition and
superimposition of experiences, a habit structure has been formed: well-practiced motion
sequences, repeatedly perceived gestalten, forms of actions and interactions have become an
implicit bodily knowledge and skill.” (Fuchs 2011)
“From the point of view of a phenomenology of the lived body, the unconscious is not an
intrapsychic reality residing in the depths "below consciousness". Rather, it surrounds and
permeates conscious life, just as in picture puzzles the figure hidden in the background surrounds
the foreground, and just as the lived body conceals itself while functioning.” 
“Unconscious fixations are like certain restrictions in a person's space of potentialities produced
by an implicit but ever-present past which declines to take part in the continuing progress of life.”
I believe this is the  recalcitrant normative past  Butt(1998) references in his assertion that “...our
natural inter-subjectivity leads to us feeling bound to our past, our relationships, and our social
practices.”
Merleau-Ponty conveys the irreducible violence of sense-making in such a system:
“ In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or polarized in
the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception of the subject as
ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the world.
 Action is, by definition, the violent transition from what I have to what I aim to have, from what I am to
what I intend to be....This is the price for there being things and ‘other people’ for us, not as the result of
some illusion, but as the result of a violent act which is perception itself. “”(Phenomenology of
Perception, p.499).
From their vantage , a sense making process that is grounded on radical self-belonging   must be a
subjectivity artificially split off from the world in an inner rationalist solipsism, purely trasnparent
to itself. For instance, Fuchs says that for Husserl there can be no unconscious, and reads this as
Cartesianism:
“...the unconscious had to be viewed as restricted to an implicit awareness that remained
potentially accessible to consciousness or reflection, and, in any case, could not basically be
foreign to the subject. In Husserl's words:
"What I do not 'know', what in my experience, my imagining, thinking, doing, is not present to me
as perceived, remembered, thought, etc., will not 'influence' my mind. And what is not in my
experience, be it ignored or implicitly-intentionally decided, does not motivate me even
unconsciously (Ideas II, p.243)
Fuchs concludes:
“...psychoanalysis and phenomenology....have a common starting point: it is in the
Cartesian view of consciousness as "clear and distinct perception", the assumption that
consciousness is transparent to itself insofar as its own contents are concerned. “
Kelly’s view of the unconscious echoes Husserl. Kelly understands the notion of the unconscious
in terms of levels of awareness. : “We do not use the conscious-unconscious dichotomy, but we
do recognize that some of the personal constructs a person seeks to subsume within his system
prove to be fleeting or elusive. Sometimes this is because they are loose rather than tight, as in the
first phase of the creative cycle. Sometimes it is because they are not bound by the symbolisms of
words or other acts. But of this we are sure, if they are important in a person’s life it is a mistake
to say they are unconscious or that he is unaware of them. Every day he experiences them, often
all too poignantly, except he cannot put his finger on them nor tell for sure whether they are at the
spot the therapist has probed for them.”(Kelly 1969a)
Kelly(1955) explains that repression is not a useful construct in personal construct theory 
“ Our theoretical position would not lead us to place so much emphasis upon what is presumably
‘repressed’. Our concern is more with the constructs which are being used by the client to
structure his world. If certain elements have dropped out of his memory it may be simply that he
has ceased to use the structures which imbued these elements with sense. We do not see these
abandoned elements as covertly operating stimuli in the client’s life.”
Butt(1998) responds to Kelly as Fuchs did to Husserl, with a charge of Cartesianism:
“Constructs are abstractions from the concrete world of events (1955, p. 110). Thus we gain the
idea that constructs are in some way behind and responsible for behavior. Deliberation might
reveal our intentions, which are ultimately available for our inspection and not subject to a process
of repression.”“When constructivists accept the ambiguity of the lived world they  can contribute
significantly to the understanding of it, while at the same  time forgoing the inevitably
disappointing project of trying to mechanistically explain it. “ 
It is not that for Kelly the  day to day changes in my thinking are necessarily inferentially tied to
previous changes in a unitary temporal flow. His Fragmentation Corollary allows that  “new
constructs are not necessarily direct derivatives of, or special cases within, one’s old constructs.”
“A man may move from an act of love to an act of jealousy, and from there to an act of hate, even
though hate is not something that would be inferred from love, even in his peculiar system.” 
“We can be sure only that the changes that take place from old to new constructs do so within a
larger system.”
 While fragmentation may characterize my transition between constructs, there is no such split
within the bipolar terms of a single construct. A construct is a ‘referential differential’, whereas
Merleau-Ponty’s and Fuchs’ bodily unconscious is a communication across a chiasm,  manifested
as the ambiguous relationship between figure and ground. From this important distinction follows
the fact that even the inferentially incompatible changes in the construct system from day to day
that the fragmentation corollary references  presuppose an underlying temporal  integrity missing
from other approaches. For Kelly, then, to claim  that thinking is never unconscious to itself is not
to render it rationalistically self-transparent. Rather, it is to say that its ongoing  self-
transformations maintain  a thematics of pragmatic relevance.
Beyond Philosophies and Psychologies of Blame: Kellian Hostility and Guilt
In fact, the way that Kelly treats moving from an act of love to an act of hate,  via his formulation
of the construct of  hostility, may indicate how far apart Kelly’s model and embodied approaches
stand concerning the issue of the fundamental integrity  of experiencing. All feeling and emotion
for Kelly expresses an awareness of the relative ongoing success or failure in relating new events
to one’s outlook.  But his definition of hostility stands out from his account of guilt, anxiety, fear
and threat in that it consists of a two-stage process.
Kelly defines hostility as “the continued effort to extort validational evidence in favor of a type of
social prediction which has already proved itself a failure.”
Notice that this definition combines awareness of a validational event(invalidation) with a
response to that event(extortion of evidence).  Furthermore, as we will see, the way in which the
first step is understood  determines the sense of  the second step, and vice versa. The crucial
importance of interpretation in  fathoming what Kelly meant by hostility can be demonstrated in
the following questions:
How far-reaching did he mean his definition to be? Is hostility the same thing as anger, and if so,
is there such a thing as healthy, adaptive, anger, or do all forms of anger extort evidence? And
what about subtle forms of affective perturbation like irritation and annoyance? Are these also
forms of hostility?
One would have to look carefully through Kelly’s writings in order to find him using what may be
synonyms for hostility. Words like annoyed, angry, rage and furious appear in the context of some
of  his discussions of hostile behaviors. For instance, “ By this time John, frustrated in his efforts
to be manly, is furious at himself, the girl, and about everything in sight, and he is in no mood to
listen to advice. He turns his rage on the father, as if somehow here was the fiend behind this
maddening woman. In a moment the old man, who I am sure only wanted to be helpful, is dead,
the victim of John's nimble sword and wildly diffused hostility .”(Kelly 1969g)
Such passages don’t go far in clearing up matters, though, because Kelly wasn’t very helpful in
clarifying how he intended his readers to link his idiosyncratic definition of hostility with more
conventional uses of that term. Readers of Kelly are left to construct an understanding of hostility
consistent with their own vantage on his work as a whole. Let us see, then, how embodied
intersubjective positions are likely to treat Kellian hostility, given the way I have represented them
in this paper.  I want to contrast these perspectives with the radically temporal interpretation I
have been advancing. I have thus far argued that for the embodied intersubjective crowd, values
are contents with which we are co-infected, indoctrinated, jointly conditioned and shaped  via our
participation within cultural norms and practices. Another way of stating  this is to say that as an
actor in an always shifting social ensemble I am always vulnerable to caprice and  temptation, to
being swayed in one direction or another semi-arbitrarily in what I care about .  As this ambiguous
being who is not fully conscious to myself, my potential for capriciously motivated behavior is
what I would like to call my fundamental blamefulness. 
Now let us say that  I have been hurt and disappointed by someone I care deeply about, and as a
result I become angry with them.  They now  approach me and say “ I know I let you down. I was
wrong and I’m sorry“ (regardless of whether I prompted them or not). One could say that the
other’s sense of their guilt and  culpability is the mirror image of my anger.  The essence of the
anger-culpability binary   here is the two parties coping , as victim and perpetrator, with their
perception of an arbitrary lapse in values, a socially catalyzed drift in commitment to the
relationship on the part of the one , and the recognition of this caprice by the other. 
Let us then suppose that the hurt party believes  that the always present possibility of the other’s
straying,  succumbing to, being overcome by alienating valuative motives, is an expression of
human motivation in general as  dependent on arbitrary bodily and intersocial determinants. This
being the case , it would not be unreasonable for the hurt individual to formulate the hopeful
notion that the blameful, that is, capricious, behavior of the other can be coaxed back to
something close to its original alignment, so that the relationship’s intimacy can be restored.  The 
hopeful quality of the anger, then , is driven by a belief in the random malleability of human
motives. I am going to call this hopeful intervention ‘adaptive anger’. 
How does this scenario fit  in relation to Kelly’s hostility definition? Although it begins with an
experience of invalidation (hurt and disappointment), we would not seem to be justified in
considering the consequent hopeful intervention  (adaptive anger)  as an example of extortion of
validational evidence. After all, the angered party isn’t  denying that the dynamics of the
relationship have changed. One can argue that  they are merely making use of their perception of
the substantial randomness in the shaping of human motives in order to attempt to reshape matters
in a more favorable direction from their vantage, and this attempt may very well be successful in
eliciting  the other’s contrition and maybe even a plea for forgiveness of their deviation. 
More precisely, the angered person’s belief that behavior is capricious will make it  appear to
them that their view of the wayward other as susceptible to outside influences has been vindicated
regardless of whether their interventionist attempts succeed in getting  the other to apologize,
express remorse, mend their ways.  The conflictual relationship scenario I sketched above was
intended to capture what I believe to be a fundamental tenet of any philosophical or  psychological
approach that is founded on the belief in the irreducibility of blame. Since I claim that the
embodied intersubjective perspectives  mentioned in this paper fit that description, it seems to me
that the idea of an ‘adaptive’ anger or related blameful response to invalidation  is  absolutely vital
to such perspectives. Any theory asserting that motive can be hostage to, conditioned by, arbitrary
deviations in interest and caring, especially the valuing of another person, would be unable to
endorse the idea that all forms of anger, irritation, condemnation or contempt are forms of
hostility representing extortion of evidence in favor of a failed outlook.  
For instance, Gendlin, a phenomenological psychologist allied with Merleau-Ponty, considers
anger to be potentially adaptive. He says that one must attempt to reassess, reinterpret, elaborate
the angering experience via felt awareness not in order to eliminate the feeling of anger but so that 
one’s anger becomes “fresh, expansive, active, constructive, and varies with changes in the 
situation”. “Anger may help handle the situation because it may make the other change or back 
away. Anger can also help the situation because it may break it entirely and thus give you new
circumstances.” “ Anger is healthy, while resentment and hate are detrimental to the organism.”  
The social constructionist Ken Gergen writes that anger has a valid role to play in social co- 
ordination “There are certain times and places in which anger is the most effective move in the 
dance.” 
Merleau-Ponty scholar John Russon(2020) offers:
“Anger can be unjustified, to be sure, and in that case it enacts a fundamentally distorted portrayal
of the other.  But anger can also be justified, and in that case it can be the only frame of mind in
which the vicious and hateful reality of the other is truly recognized.” (The Place of Love).
Robert Solomon (1977), champion of the view that emotions are central to meaning and
significance in  human life, says that anger can be ‘right’.  
“ Anger, for example, is not just a burst of venom, and it is not as such sinful, nor is it necessarily 
a “negative” emotion. It can be “righteous,” and it can sometimes be right.”
McCoy (1977) upheld Kelly’s definition of hostility and anger as products of invalidated
construing but found it necessary to exclude contempt from this description. She defined contempt
as “awareness that the core role of another is comprehensively different from one’s own and or
does not meet the norms of social expectation”  (P 97.). 
Contempt, on her reading, represents validated construing, because “contempt predicts  
that it’s object will experience guilt “(P 98). Thus, the threatened structure is relieved of the threat 
caused by the others social deviation by a reaffirmation of the present system.
Let’s now see how the above accounts compare with my radically temporal reading of Kellian
hostility. If , for any psychology, the arbitrariness of blame is irreducible in direct proportion to
the belief that the in-itself valuative content of our experiencing contributes to a shaping of our
motives and behavior in a way that we are not explicitly or implicitly aware of  (Fuchs’ horizontal
unconscious), then this would seem to be incompatible with the spirit of Kelly’s Choice corollary,
which states that a  a person chooses for themself that alternative in a dichotomized construct
through which they anticipate the greater possibility for extension and definition of their system. 
The Choice Corollary exemplifies the central importance of process, and the near irrelevance of
valuative content, in the organization of the construct system. The direction of motivation is
driven by the anticipatory integrity of the relationships between near-meaningless-in-themselves
contents, not by the supposed value-substance of the contents themselves. Kelly says “As in all
cases of hostility, the frustrated therapist starts to see the hazard as inherent in the elements which
he has been unable to construe successfully rather than in his construction of them.”
As I have written, to say that pleasure is what motivates us in our choices is as much as to say that
improvement in anticipatory efficacy, what Kelly calls elaboration, motivates our behavior. In his
process approach, all behavior is oriented toward making our world more intimately
understandable.  It is true that personal construct theory does not view pain and pleasure through a
reinforcement lens, but this is  because stimulus-response theory considers hedonic feeling to be
the content of a physiological event. For Kelly, pleasure, pain and all other variants of affective
valuation, are not properties of internal, external, nor socially shared value contents, but are a
function of how intimately, and how multi-dimensionally, we relate events to each other.
Validational evidence is just another way of describing the affectively felt assimilative coherence
of the construed flow of events and therefore it is synonymous with feeling valence. If one avoids
collapsing into emotional confusion as a result of an invalidating event, it is not because
validation and feeling can be separated, but because the invalidation impacted a relatively
subordinate portion of the construct system.
Kelly wrote: “It is not merely the invalidation of a construct that produces anxiety. 
Anxiety appears only if the construct is abandoned—appears no longer relevant— and there is
nothing to take its place.”
Believing that motivation is a function of semi-arbitrary shapings arising out of our sedimented
participation in social interactions intertwined with bodily dynamics, the  approaches I have been
critiquing do not see hedonic valuation as necessarily  synonymous with the pragmatic efficacy of
construing. For instance , Butt(1998) splits off hedonic valence from the organizational integrity
of experiencing. He believes that personal motivation is at the mercy of influences outside our
control. Thus, we can be motivated to make choices that are self-defeating, not  within our
control, not in our best interest. 
“... there is surely a danger that the constructivist assumes a good reason for every action,  
that every action represents an elaborative choice.““Kelly does not seem to entertain the 
possibility that the person ever makes non-elaborative choices.” 
In situations of personal distress, “the client might not be able to make any sense of the concept 
[of elaborative choice]. His or her experience is usually of being out of control, at the mercy of  
mysterious impulse. “ 
Such impulses do not originate from an internal construct system or other persons in a 
unidirectional manner , but are the product of joint action emerging from the social flow. 
“Being respectful of their choices does not mean implying that they have a cognitive system 
operating silently in their best interests beneath their awareness. It means helping them realize 
how they are sedimented in their interactions with the world, particularly the social world. If they 
opt for change, the system that will need to accommodate to it is social rather than cognitive.” 
Butt’s grounding of motive in socially shared value content threatens to turn Kelly’s elaborative
choice into a bouncing between the repressiveness of entrenched sedimented habit and the chaos
of a leap in the dark. Butt fails to see that the construct system does not achieve its integrative
continuity through any positive internal power. On the contrary, it simply lacks the formidability
of value content implied by socially embedded sedimentation necessary to impose the
arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning on the movement of experiential process. What drives
choice in Kelly’s Choice corollary isn’t a rationalist ‘gyroscope’ but the opposite, the replacement
of polarizing  value content with constructive process. From Kelly’s perspective it is Butt’s
sedimented, habitual social gestalt that fits the description of a dominating gyroscope. Beneath the
apparent chaos and  whim of blame (being ‘at the mercy of  mysterious impulse’)  lies a radically
temporal order in psychological movement that proves why neither  my own nor another’s
processes are capable of the content-driven arbitrariness that could lead to the ‘thoughtlessness’ of 
anger-producing culpability.  
Why can one’s own processes never be ‘thoughtless’ enough to produce culpability in oneself  
and justify anger on the part of another? Because Kelly’s elaborative choice reflects the fact that
definition or  extension of one’s system defines or extends dimensional senses with not enough
substance,  force, power within themselves to arbitrarily polarize, disrupt, condition and repress.
Polarization,  force, capriciousness, repression are required as irreducible in experiencing in order
for the blamefulness  hostility and anger to be primordially justified.  What makes Kelly’s
definition of hostile so remarkable, then, is that it implies  that ALL situations that I  interpret as
apparent capriciousness NECESSARILY represent an invalid construal of the situation on my
part, and that, even if I am unable to arrive at a crisp construction that instantly  dispels the
justification for my hostility, there is such an explanation OF NECESSITY.  Blame is an
impermeable construct, one that must be abandoned once it is understood that intention could
never be arbitrary or capricious. 
“Some day we may know who to blame for a child's troubles, or we may give up the construct of 
"blame" altogether.”(Kelly 1963)
 As in the scenario I described of the hopeful interventionist impulse of ’adaptive’ anger, I
interpret the extortionist impulse of hostility as  rooted in the hopeful desire to influence the other
back where I think they should have been, even when there is no  communication with another,
either verbal, gestural or physical. The attempt at extorting evidence begins with the hopeful
thought that my attempt at influencing the other may be effective.  Even the most subtle variants
of anger are inconceivable without my sense that the person who disappointed me can be coaxed
by me,  whether gently or not so gently, back to where we believe they should have been . 
For this reason, I believe that Kelly intended his definition of hostility to apply to all feelings and 
expressions of blame aimed at another (or oneself in self-anger). These include: irritation, 
annoyance, disapproval, condemnation, feeling insulted, taking umbrage, resentment, 
exasperation, impatience, hatred, ire, outrage, contempt, righteous indignation, ‘adaptive’ anger, 
perceiving the other as deliberately thoughtless, lazy, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate,
disrespectful, disgraceful, greedy, evil, sinful, criminal. Any of the above feelings represent a
failure to understand what is in principle understandable without blame via a reorganization of 
one’s construct system. 
At the heart of blameful feeling is an unanswered question. What is the rationale behind the
perpetrator’s unfathomable behavior? Unable to come up with any workable justifiable
explanation of the other’s seemingly perverse shift in motive, the offended person attempts to
coerce the other into feeling self-blame, to ‘knock some sense back into them’. But since we don't
know why they violated our expectation of them, why and how they failed to do what our
blameful anger tells us they `should have' according to our prior estimation of their relation to us,
this guilt-inducing process is tentative, unsure.  
Even if we succeed in getting the blameful other to atone and re-establish their previous intimacy 
with us, we understand them no better than we did prior to their hostility-generating action, and 
thus our hostility provides an inadequate solution to our puzzlement and anxiety. All we have 
learned from the episode is that they other is potentially untrustworthy, unpredictable.  The
ineffectiveness of this approach can be seen in the fact that even if contempt succeeds in 
getting the perpetrator to mend their ways, an adequate understanding of his or her puzzling
motives has not been achieved. The very success of the contempt delays the pursuit of a 
permeable construction within which the other’s apparently arbitrary disappointing deviation from
what one expected of them can be seen as a necessary, adaptive elaboration of their way of
construing their role in the relationship.  
When confronted with behavior of another that is comprehensively different from our own, a 
mystery to us, and especially when it disturbs us, we are challenged by Kelly to bridge the gap 
between ourselves and the other not by attributing the problem to the other’s being at the mercy of 
capriciously wayward motives which we may hope to re-shape, but by striving to subsume the 
other’s outlook within a revised version of our own system. What is left of the construct of
hostility if blaming another can be adaptive rather than always an extortion of evidence? It
becomes a toothless irrationality, a not being willing to accept that another has hurt me, let me
down, disrespected me, fallen out of love with me. Hostility would be strictly an attempt to prove
to oneself that the immediate insult never took place.
But even when one is convinced that the insult did indeed take place and can never be undone or 
denied, even when one pleads with, cajoles and threatens the other to reconsider their actions and 
apologize, even when one succeeds in eliciting the other’s remorse, even when one forgives the 
other’s transgression and prepares themself to start afresh in the relationship, all these changes 
in construing amount to no more than a retrenchment of the original inadequate outlook . Contrary
to McCoy’s (1977) contention that contempt, which she defines as  the expectation that the other
will experience guilt, represents validated construing, such an expectation, as a hopeful wish, 
would express the very essence of hostility. The intensity of our feeling of contempt is in direct
proportion to the unwillingness of the other to display guilt. Thus, the essential quality of
contempt is the need to make the other feel guilty. 
That Kelly(1955)  was not a fan of the cycle of blame, apology and forgiveness is suggested in the
following: 
“ Punishment may occasionally be used to make a person feel guilty and anxious in the honest  
hope that he will mend his ways. Sometimes we say that we ‘punish the crime and not the  
criminal’. This is silly; the ‘criminal’ gets punished nonetheless. We hope, however, that he will  
see that it is only a part of him that is condemned. The epigrammatic slogan may be a semantic  
device for leaving the door open for him to reestablish his role in our society rather than going out 
and establishing a core role which is outside our society.” 
For Kelly, transcending anger by revising one’s construction of the event means arriving at an  
explanation that does not require the other’s contrition, which only serves to appease the hostile 
person rather than enlighten him. For the same reason, Kelly eschewed forgiveness and turning 
the other cheek. Such gestures only make sense in the context of blame, which implies a belief in 
the potential arbitrariness and capriciousness of human motives. Seeking the other’s atonement is 
not considered by Kelly to reflect an effective understanding of the original insult. Recounting a 
parable of Jesus and a woman“ He didn't even forgive her; that sort of unction didn't seem to be 
called for.” (Kelly 1961)
From Kelly’s vantage, if, rather than getting  angry or condemning another who wrongs me, I
respond with loving forgiveness, my absolution of the other presupposes my hostility toward
them. I can only forgive the other’s trespass to the extent that I recognize a sign of contrition or
confession on their part. Ideals of so-called unconditional forgiveness, of turning the other cheek,
loving one's oppressor, could also be understood as  conditional in various ways. In the absence of
the other's willingness to atone, I may forgive evil when I believe that there are special or
extenuating circumstances which will allow me to view the perpetrator as less culpable (the sinner
knows not what he does). I can say the other was blinded or deluded, led astray. My offer  of grace
is then subtly hostile, both an embrace and a slap. I hold forth the carrot of my love as a lure,
hoping thereby to uncloud the other's conscience so as to enable them to discover their culpability.
In opening my arms, I hope the prodigal son will return chastised, suddenly aware of a need to be
forgiven. Even when there is held little chance that the sinner will openly acknowledge his sin, I
may hope that my  outrage connects with a seed of regret and contrition buried deep within the
other, as if my `unconditional' forgiveness is an acknowledgment of God's or the subliminal
conscience of the other's apologizing in the name of the sinner. 
Kelly’s  formulation of hostility as an extortionistic irrealism may have left the door open for
personal construct theory writers to interpret it narrowly as an outright denial of a reality staring a
person in the face. 
Indeed, his use of those terms implies that the hostile person is aware at some level that their
attempts at attaining evidence to confirm their original hypothesis  is misguided, that they are
pretending to themselves that their original assessment of the situation is still valid when a part of
themselves already knows better. This seems to have encouraged a tendency among some
personal construct theory  writers (see, for example, Kev Harding(2015)) to turn hostility into
what sounds to me more like a psychoanalytic-style defense mechanism than an elaborative
choice.
 By this I mean  I don’t think hostility’s extortionist impulse should be read as self-deceptive
denial that one was significantly surprised and disappointed by another’s actions, so much as a
settling for an inadequate explanation for the reasons behind the other’s unpredictability. That is
to say, when in anger I seek to extort evidence, what I am attempting to validate is my 
impermeable construal of the other’s intent as ambiguous, obstinate and perverse. My anger is
motivated by, and looks for further confirmation of,  my pre-existing belief that the people I care
about  are susceptible to behaving  in recalcitrant, dangerous ways. 
“The hostile person insists that it is the elements which must be recalcitrant rather than his own 
thinking. Since many of his elements are people, he sees them as recalcitrant....he feels that the 
hazard lies in the people with whom he allowed himself to get mixed up. He thinks it is the people 
who are dangerous, not his construction of them. Thus he sees his difficulty as arising out of his 
ill-considered experimentation with inherently dangerous elements.” (Kelly 1955)
In one sense, this is a valid assessment, given the starting premise of  the unfathomability of
human motives. But because that starting premise is an ineffective guide for subsuming others’
behavior,  it leaves the person who relies on it vulnerable to all manner of future traumatic
surprises. In this sense it is a failure as an anticipatory device,  and the extorting of the other’s
contrition and apology only reaffirms this  failure. For instance, Trevor Butt’s belief that the
experience of a person in distress “is usually of being out of control, at the mercy of mysterious
impulse“ implies that an intervention that he might recommend in response to a client’s seemingly
unpredictable ‘self-defeating’ behavior would be based on blaming ‘mysterious impulses’ for the
client’s actions. Although such a response would fit Kelly’s definition of hostility, it seems a bit
excessive to treat Butt’s construal as self-deceptive. Rather, the blameful intervention would be
driven by a valid but somewhat impermeable construal of the client’s outlook.
Just as the person who understands personal construct theory can no longer believe in the
blamefulness of anger, he can 
also no longer believe in the self-blame of guilt. This doesn’t mean he doesn’t experience the pain
of knowing his loss of role was responsible for another’s potential or actual suffering, or his own.
Kelly defines guilt as the perception of one’s apparent dislodgment from one’s core role structure.
Whatever one does in the light of his understanding of others' outlooks may be regarded as his
role. In guilt, our falling away from another we care for could be spoken of as an alienation of  
oneself from oneself. When we feel we have failed another, we mourn our mysterious dislocation  
from a competence or value which we associated ourselves with. It follows from this that any  
thinking of guilt as a `should have, could have’ blamefulness deals in a notion of dislocation and  
distance, of a mysterious discrepancy within intended meaning, separating who we were from who 
we are in its teasing gnawing abyss. But to have assimilated the lessons of personal construct
theory is to perceive one’s  guilt as a paired-down suffering because it is a responsibility without
self-blame.
What’s the difference between a blameful and a non-blameful awareness that one’s construction
of one’s role with respect to another has lost a former intimacy and coherence? It is the flip side of 
blameful hostility at the other’s changed construction of their role in relation to me.  In both cases,
the philosophies of blame attribute an aspect of value to the intrinsic content of an element of
meaning, so one can be conditioned by an outside influence to arbitrarily lose or lessen one’s
ability to care about another. My anger then tries to recondition that feeling of caring back into the
other person (knock some sense back into them).  But for Kelly, value and caring is never an
attribute or property of a content of meaning, but is  instead a function of the assimilative intricacy
and permeability of the movement from one  moment of experience to the next. The good
therapist “does not become annoyed with his data! “ “...he seeks to bring about changes which are
based on understanding rather than on blame.” 
The Choice corollary guarantees that the behavior that one later feels guilty about was the best one 
could do at the time to elaborate one’s system.  Kelly’s elaborative choice determines the direction
of this temporal flow as always either toward increased understanding, or at least preservation of
one’s current level of understanding.  When Kelly talked about sin and guilt in terms of mistakes,
he invariably added a caveat that  what appears as a mistake from some external perspective can
just as well be seen as a deviation  from the conventional or the basis of a new outlook. Speaking
of his feelings of guilt after his heart attack:
“ Besides, I still could not put my finger on where all my mistakes had been - mostly I knew only 
where I had deviated from convention - or whether all of them had actually been mistakes; nor did 
I know what could readily be done even if they had been mistakes. Naturally, I had some clues, 
here and there, but, in the main these were questions it would take years to work out, and, if I did 
well with them, they would be followed by further, more perspicacious questions.” (Kelly 1960)
 
Ontological Acceleration: Kelly’s ‘Realism’ as Constructive Development
I have suggested that Kelly’s notion of hostility and guilt as the failure to understand what is in
principle understandable without recourse to blame justifies itself on the basis of a fundamental
organizational principle of personal construct theory: construction processes are inherently too
integral to be capable of the  arbitrariness and capriciousness implied by blame, regardless of the
status of their permeability.  Whatever Kelly envisioned the ‘end’ of history to look like, I take his
definitions of hostility and guilt, his choice corollary and articulation of anticipation as
replicatively oriented, to constitute an unwavering  statement about the  fundamental  order
driving  psychological functioning. If assimilating the lessons of personal construct theory means I 
need never be hostile, it is not because I can guarantee I will be always be able to flawlessly
reconstrue another’s action such that I no longer see them as culpable.  Rather, personal construct
theory tells me that, in principle,  the organization of  psychological processes is too integral to
justify the abyss of blame  As long as I am able to take this as a matter of faith, that is, as an
ongoing hypothesis,  and as  long as I don’t find this supposition invalidated, then it is irrelevant
whether or not in any specific instance I am able to come up with precise reasons why other
person was not culpable for my disappointment.  
Let’s see if we can tie this organizational a priori to Kelly’s statements about the nature of the
universe. Perhaps we might also clarify  Kelly’s seemingly contradictory statements about the
nature of reality  within a  radically temporal perspective. In the introduction to his 1955 text,
Kelly says:  
“The universe that we presume exists has another important characteristic: it is integral. By that
we mean it functions as a single unit with all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to
each other. This may, at first, seem a little implausible, since ordinarily it would appear that there
is a closer relationship between the motion of my fingers and the action of the typewriter keys
than there is, say, between either of them and the price of yak milk in Tibet. But we believe that,
in the long run, all of these events—the motion of my fingers, the action of the keys, and the
price of yak milk—are interlocked. It is only within a limited section of the universe, that part we
call earth and that span of time we recognize as our present eon, that two of these necessarily
seem more closely related to each other than either of them is to the third. A simple way of saying
this is to state that time provides the ultimate bond in all relationships.”
 Kelly says all events in the universe are interlocked via temporal succession. What does he mean
by interlocked? He says  “all its imaginable parts have an exact relationship to each other”, but by
‘exact’ he doesn’t appear to mean an objectively causal exactitude, even though he describes it as
all working “together like clockwork”. The order of material causality is dictated by the empirical
content, which is inherently arbitrary. A car engine’s parts have an exact causal relationship with
each other,  but not an inferential one. If one part were removed, the others would retain their
identity, even if the engine no longer worked. By contrast, in Kelly’s form of interlocking, any
two events are just as closely related to each other as either of them is to the third. In other words,
all events are inferentially, relevantly, motivationally, replicatively related to each other like an
optimally enlightened construct system, which is different  than saying they are just causally
connected. 
To Chiari(2017)  Kelly’s talk of a convergence between the psychological system and reality
suggests an epistemological constructivism, a speculation on the specific content or form of
reality external to the construing person.
“I believe that Kelly indeed spread his wings from a realistic view of knowledge towards a view 
that nowadays can be considered constructivist, yet remaining suspended in mid-air, that is, 
without transcending once and for all the opposition between realism and idealism, and this for 
two reasons. The first is his personal rooting in a rationalistic view of science, of which his early 
formation in engineering and mathematics is evidence. The second is his limited knowledge of 
phenomenology, he regarded as a form of idealism portraying “environment as a figment of […] 
imagination” (Kelly, 1969/1965, p. 219). 
Certainly Kelly never gave up a realist-sounding language that spoke of a universe seemingly ‘out 
there’ and which we are mirroring more and more accurately through successive approximations, 
but is this a symptom of a theoretical limitation or a weakness of articulation, the product of 
looseness in Kelly’s verbalization of what he believed?  If one follows the implications of the
theory itself, it seems to me what one ends up with is not a correspondence theory of truth, but
rather a developmental teleology of intentionality itself directed toward endlessly increasing
internal integration. This subordinates what would be external’ in reality to relational activity
between subject and world. I think that’s what Kelly(1955) was aiming at with the following
awkward rendering: 
“The truths the theories attempt to fix are successive approximations to the larger scheme of 
things which slowly they help to unfold.” 
Notice that Kelly does not say our approximations UNCOVER what was presumed to be already 
there in an independently existing world. Rather, our approximations help to UNFOLD that  
reality. I interpret this to mean that our approximations co-create the ‘larger scheme of things’. 
This sounds like a constructivist rather than a realist idea.  The asymptotic convergence of ‘outer
reality’ and human formulations, then, far from being a progressively more exact inner mirroring
of an outer causal machine, has the character of Kelly’s Organization corollary, the events of the
universe functioning as sequential variations on a moving superordinate theme.  The content of
the theme seems to be beside the point. In fact content doesn’t seem to play a significant role
either on the side of the subject or the world. A psychology in which the in-itself content of events
plays second fiddle to the relationship between events and the psychological system is not much
of a realism. By the same token, a construct system guided by no ‘internal gyroscope’ other than
the abstracting of events along dimensions of similarity and difference doesn’t seem to accord
with the kind of inner content- based rationalism that his critics attribute  to him.  
The  content-impoverished nature of a construed universe implies that at the same time  the
construct system aims toward ever greater harmony and multi-dimensional correlation and
similarity to experiencing, the irreducible structural basis of this movement is from the start
already constituted as a radical intimacy even in experiences of chaos, hostility, and other forms of
emotional suffering  and trauma. I think it is the progressively self-organizing movement of this
subjective-objective relationality that Kelly was struggling to convey in his talk about the
knower’s approximation of, or convergence with, a real world.
In this 1963 passage, Kelly confuses us by waffling on the question of an ordered universe. 
“ Do I not believe the universe is organized? My answer to that is that I would not claim to know 
that it is. Whether it is organized or not is still one of those things that are unknown. I don't even 
know whether it is a good question or not.”
 
If it is not a good question, is that because Kelly was groping toward a way to articulate the idea 
that the world is better understood as structurally coupled with our construals of it than as 
independently existing?
Kelly continues: “ But while I don't know the answer to the question, I need not be immobilized.
There is a psychology for getting along with the unknown. It is a psychology that says in effect,
"Why not go ahead and construe it to be organized-or disorganized, if you prefer-and do
something about it.” (Kelly 1963)
Earlier in the same paper, he clarifies what I think was always his real aim.
“Let us say that the whole of truth lies ahead of us, rather than that some parts of it ahead and 
some behind. What we possess, or what we have achieved so far, are approximations of the truth, 
not fragments of it. Hopefully we are getting closer, in some sort of asymptotic progression, and, 
at some infinite point in time, science and reality may indeed converge.“
It was never a pre-schematized external reality that he had in mind, but rather an intricately
developmental constructive process. The universe, then, is not out there, but in the in-between.
Nevertheless, this in-between is a teleological arrow, a self-reflexively progressive movement. 
A consistent theme in his work since his 1930 thesis at Edinborough(The Social Inheritance) is 
that of an accelerating tempo of human invention. 
“... the pace of sequential transformation is accelerating, causing the task of the Darwinian 
psychologist, who assumes the evolution of human behavior has leveled off, to get so far out of 
hand he is threatened with extinction.” (Kelly 1969c)
“...human behavior falls into a progressively moving sequence, an orbit of infinite proportions...” 
As itself a development, our understanding of the universe is accelerating toward infinitely
integral correlation: 
“The more independent [reference] axes upon which we project an event the greater the 
psychological depth in which we see it, and the more meaningful it becomes to us.“ 
“Consider the coefficient of correlation between two variables. If that coefficient is anything but 
zero and if it expresses a linear relationship, then an infinite increase in the variance of one of the 
variables will cause the coefficient to approach unity as a limit. The magnitude of the coefficient 
of correlation is therefore directly proportional to the breadth of perspective in which we envision 
the variables whose relationship it expresses. This is basically true of all relationships within our 
universe.”(Kelly 1955)
Conclusion
As much as Kelly’s theory traffics in a vocabulary evocative of engineering mechanics, any
attempt to pigeonhole personal construct theory  as rationalist or realist is faced with a quandary.
Idealism and empirical realism belong together as opposite poles of a Cartesian subject-object
split. As Merleau-Ponty(1962) explained: 
“...its intellectualist [idealist] antithesis is on the same level as empiricism itself. Both take the
objective world as the object of their analysis, when this comes first neither in time nor in virtue
of its meaning; and both are incapable of expressing the peculiar way in which perceptual
consciousness constitutes its object.” 
 
As such, the divide between inside and outside they instantiate results in an articulation of
experience in terms of polarizing internal or worldly contents arbitrarily forcing themselves on the
experiencing person, what Kelly called ‘pushes’ and pulls’. Beck’s cognitive therapy and Ellis’
rational emotive therapy exemplify the oppositional relationship between a rationalist interpretive
template and an assumed independently existing reality that commandeers that schematics. But
any search for evidence of such forces in the organization of the  personal construct system will
come up empty-handed. Pushes and pulls are conspicuously lacking from Kelly’s depiction of the
relationship between the construing subject and their world. The Sociality corollary rejects the
idea of a reciprocally conditioned second person vantage, while the Choice corollary and Hostility
definition eschew the notion of blameful, capricious motivating demons. 
In fact, in comparison with the organizational dynamics of personal construct theory, it is the
embodied intersubjective perspectives I have cited in this paper which deliver the person over to
semi-arbitrary shapings from both the social sphere and the person’s own body, encapsulated in
sedimented bodily and interpersonally formed  norms and practices. It is worth repeating my
earlier claim:  The construct system does not achieve its integrative continuity through any
rationalist internal power. On the contrary, it simply lacks the formidability of value content
implied by socially embedded and physically embodied sedimentation necessary to impose the
arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning on the movement of experiential process.It is up to the
reader to determine whether this radically temporal approach amounts to  omitting  a vital feature
of the experienced world, or if it instead captures the nature of reality in a more profound and
intimate fashion.  
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